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Fantasy SCOTUS
Crowdsourcing a Prediction Market for the
Supreme Court
By Josh Blackman,* Adam Aft** and Corey Carpenter***
The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the
public force through the instrumentality of the courts.1
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
It is tough to make predictions, especially about the future.2
-Yogi Berra

I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Every year the Supreme Court of the United States captivates the minds and
curiosity of millions of Americans—yet the inner-workings of the Court are not fully
transparent. The Court, without explanation, decides only the cases it wishes. They
deliberate and assign authorship in private. The Justices hear oral arguments, and
without notice, issue an opinion months later. They sometimes offer enigmatic clues
during oral arguments through their questions. Between arguments and the day the Court
issues an opinion, the outcome of a case is essentially a mystery. Sometimes the outcome
falls along predictable lines; other times the outcome is a complete surprise.
Court watchers frequently make predictions about the cases in articles, on blogs,
and elsewhere. Individually, some may be right, some may be wrong. Until recently,
there was not a way to pool together this collective wisdom and aggregate ex ante
predictions for all cases pending before the United States Supreme Court.
Now there is such a tool. FantasySCOTUS.net from the Harlan Institute is the
Internet’s premier Supreme Court Fantasy League,3 and the first crowdsourced prediction
*

Josh Blackman is the creator of FantasySCOTUS and President of the Harlan Institute. In August of
2012, Josh will be an Assistant Professor of Law at South Texas College of Law.
**
Law clerk for a federal judge.
***
George Mason University School of Law, J.D. (expected May 2012). The authors would like to thank
Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, Tom Bell, Aaron Buhl, Miriam Cherry, Orin Kerr, Larry Ribstein,
Lawrence Solum, Justin Wolfers, and Todd Zywicki. The authors dedicate this Article to F.A. Hayek and
Larry Ribstein.
1
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897).
2
NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE 136 (2d ed.
2010). This quotation has been apocryphally attributed to Yogi Berra. Id. at 136 annot.
3
With 10,000 members and rising, one writer declared FantasySCOTUS the “hottest new fantasy-league
game.” Bill Mears, Frustrated with Fantasy Football? Try the Supreme Court, CNN JUSTICE (Dec. 16,
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market for jurisprudential speculation. During the October 2009 Supreme Court Term,
over 5,000 members made more than 11,000 predictions for all eighty-one cases decided.
Based on these data, FantasySCOTUS correctly predicted the outcome in more than fifty
percent of the cases decided, and the top-ranked predictors forecasted seventy-five
percent of the cases correctly. This essay explores the wisdom of the crowds in this
prediction market and assesses the accuracy of FantasySCOTUS.
Part II provides an overview of the literature about the wisdom of the crowds,
crowdsourcing, and prediction markets. By pooling together and aggregating the
collective wisdom of many people with expansive knowledge, accurate predictions about
future events can be determined to a degree of accuracy unobtainable by individuals.
Part III introduces FantasySCOTUS and explains the rules of the game.
FantasySCOTUS generated a novel data set with thousands of data points demonstrating
how Court watchers viewed the Supreme Court and the decisions of the Justices.
Part IV assesses the accuracy of FantasySCOTUS with internal and external tests.
First, to test the power of the wisdom of the crowds, this Article compares the predictions
of the FantasySCOTUS “power predictors”—those who made predictions for more than
seventy-five percent of the cases—with the FantasySCOTUS “crowd”—those who made
predictions for less than seventy-five percent of the cases. The crowd performed worse
than the power predictors, but not by much. This result lends support to the wisdom of
the crowds theory, wherein a larger pool of predictors with a broader range of knowledge
can often predict as well as, if not better than, so-called experts. Additionally, this
Article demonstrates how the results are distinguishable from randomized results, such as
coin-flips or a million monkeys playing FantasySCOTUS on iPads.
Second, this Article compares FantasySCOTUS predictions to the Supreme Court
Forecasting Project’s decision tree and experts, finding that the FantasySCOTUS power
predictors surpassed.4 The Forecasting Project’s decision-tree relied on past voting data
of the Justices to calculate the vote for any given case. The Forecasting Project also
assembled a group of expert scholars and practitioners who predicted the same cases.
The FantasySCOTUS power predictors predicted 64.7% of the cases correctly, surpassing
the Forecasting Project’s experts, though the difference was not statistically significant.
The decision tree predicted 75% of the cases correctly, which is more accurate than the
Forecasting Project’s experts, who only predicted 59.1% of the cases correctly. The
2009, 2:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/16/scotus.journal/index.html; see also Josh
Blackman, Asked About FantasySCOTUS.net in an Interview, Justice Breyer Responded: “I Don’t Think I
Will Bet on It,” JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 30, 2009, 10:30 AM),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/?p=2655 (quoting Justice Breyer on the importance of public interest in the
Court); Bruce Carton, Plenty of Fantasy Players on This Bench, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Nov. 13, 2009,
11:41 AM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2009/11/fantasyscoutusnet-the-premiersupreme-court-fantasy-league.html (deeming FantasySCOTUS the “new gold standard in Supreme Court
geekery”).
4
Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1154–55 (2004).
The Forecasting Project developed a sophisticated Super Cruncher algorithm and, utilizing decision trees,
predicted how the Justices during the October 2002 Term would decide cases based on certain
characteristics of a case—such as circuit of origin, type of case, and the political ideology of the case. See
id.; see also infra note 5 and accompanying text. To test the power of their model, the organizers of the
Forecasting Project assembled a cadre of Supreme Court experts, litigators, and academics to make
predictions about the same cases. Ruger et al., supra, at 1154–55.
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FantasySCOTUS top three power predictors not only outperformed the Forecasting
Project’s top three experts, but also slightly outperformed the decision-tree algorithm—
75.7% to 75%. This comparison provides insight into the wisdom of the crowds
compared to the wisdom of specialized experts, as well as the power of a sophisticated
algorithm that can “Super Crunch” the data.5
Part V provides an assessment of the limitations of the first version of
FantasySCOTUS. As novel as these results are for the first season, FantasySCOTUS’
current predictive capabilities are respectable, but not reliable—at best, it was wrong
between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of the time. In light of the fact that the
Supreme Court typically reverses approximately seventy percent of the cases it considers,
these predictions are even less helpful.6 FantasySCOTUS 1.0 should be understood for
what it does. In its current iteration, FantasySCOTUS provides real-time ex ante
predictions for individual cases. No other product performs this task for every case
argued during the term.
Part VI considers whether a Supreme Court prediction market merely mirrors
media reports about the cases—that is, whether people make predictions based on
coverage about the cases in the news and blogosphere.7 Using a comprehensive
searching process—that considers both old school and new school media, such as popular
legal blogs—we found a strong correlation between the amount of media attention and
the accuracy of predictions. The power predictors’ edge is dulled for cases that receive
significant media coverage. For less popular cases that receive less media attention and
about which there is less easily accessable information for prospective predictors, the
crowd tends to generate less accurate predictions. In contrast, power predictors, who
likely perform their own due diligence and research irrespective of media coverage, can
better predict even the least noteworthy cases on the docket.
FantasySCOTUS is only two years old, but the implications and applications of this
information market are intriguing.
Part VII considers the possible future of
FantasySCOTUS. First, from a jurisprudential perspective, FantasySCOTUS illuminates
public perceptions of how the Supreme Court works as an institution. Specifically, it
serves as a comprehensive polling device to provide an honest, albeit unscientific, survey
that reflects how a large sample size of Court watchers view the Justices and their legal
realist ideological proclivities, particularly in 5–4 decisions. If FantasySCOTUS can
accurately reduce each of the Justices to nothing more than a conservative or liberal vote,

5

IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING-BY-NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE SMART 10 (2007)
(“Super Crunchers . . . analyze[] large datasets to discover empirical correlations between seemingly
unrelated things. . . . Super Crunching . . . is a statistical analysis that impacts real-world decisions.”).
6
In the 2010 Term, the Court reversed seventy-two percent of merit cases before it and seventy-one percent
in the 2009 Term. Stat Pack for October Term 2010, SUP. CT. U.S. BLOG 4 (June 28, 2011),
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf [hereinafter
Stat Pack OT2010]; SCOTUSblog Final Stats OT09—7.7.10, SUP. CT. U.S. BLOG 10 (July 7, 2010),
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/Final-Stats-OT09-0707101.pdf [hereinafter Stat
Pack OT2009] (indicating the Supreme Court reversed 71% of its cases during the October Term 2009).
7
Professor Orin Kerr mentioned this possibility in a 2005 blog post. Orin Kerr, Tradesports and Supreme
Court Nominations, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 19, 2005, 2:23 PM),
http://volokh.com/posts/1121797428.shtml (“As a result, a site [prediction market] like TradeSports would
seem to just mirror the collective common wisdom of newspapers and blogs on a question like this. Am I
missing something?”).
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that may have broader implications to the rule of law and objective, detached standards of
judging.
¶10
From a practical perspective, with more accurate future versions of
FantasySCOTUS, attorneys will be able to rely on this program to assist them with
litigation decisions involving cases pending before the Supreme Court. As our
understanding of judicial behavior improves—perhaps through scanning all filings in
PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records)—and the program can shift from a
pure crowdsourcing technique to a commoditized Super Cruncher information service, a
prediction engine can be created for lower courts. An interactive litigation assistant—
think of the iPhone’s Siri application—could allow attorneys and laymen alike to
instantly understand and grasp the law in any given area by simply asking questions.8
Such technology would be of great value for practicing attorneys, and provide access to
justice to people who cannot afford lawyers. This is the promise of law’s information
revolution, of which we hope FantasySCOTUS is but a first step to the future.9
II. IT’S TOUGH TO MAKE PREDICTIONS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE
¶11

The title of this section, apocryphally attributed to Yogi Berra,10 recognizes the
infirmity of the human mind to make predictions about the future: simply put, “we just
can’t predict.”11 While it is quite difficult for an individual to make predictions about the
future, crowds, pooling together their collective knowledge and wisdom, are able to
generate accurate predictions about unknowable events. This section explores the
wisdom of the crowds, as this phenomenon is known. Prediction markets, which
aggregate and assemble this wisdom, are systematic approaches to making informed
predictions about the future.
A. The Wisdom of the Crowds

The wisdom of the crowds, popularized by a book by that name,12 explores how
collective knowledge can be pooled together to address problems more efficiently and
accurately than decisions from individuals. The beauty of the wisdom of the crowds
results from its simplicity; there are no formulas, no self-anointed experts, no normative
biases from the creators of the system. Crowds are just people—people who by
themselves might not be able to make consistently accurate predictions, but when pooled
together generate a level of accuracy unobtainable by individuals.
¶13
“The ‘wisdom of crowds’ is generally more accurate and more objective than the
judgment of one uninformed ‘expert.’”13 Perhaps the most popular example of the
¶12

8

Josh Blackman, Siri for the Law, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 1, 2011, 11:33 PM),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2011/11/01/siri-for-the-law/.
9
See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law’s Information Revolution, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1169
(2011).
10
TALEB, supra note 2, at 136 annot.
11
Id. at 135.
12
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004).
13
Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 123, 157 (2006) (quoting SUROWIECKI, supra note 12, at xv).
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wisdom of the crowds is the “ask the audience” lifeline on the game show Who Wants to
Be a Millionaire. If the contestant on the show is unable to answer a multiple choice
question, she can pose the question to the studio audience. Instantly, the votes of each
member in the audience are displayed on a screen. For over ninety percent of the
questions posed to the crowd, the audience, which possesses a wider swath of knowledge,
provided a correct answer where the individual contestant, who possessed a narrower
range of information, could not.14 Indeed, “[u]ncertainty is a painful part of reality; it is
only natural that the wisdom of the crowd would be summoned to battle it.”15
¶14
James Surowiecki identifies four factors to determine whether a crowd is wise.16
First, the crowd must possess a diversity of opinions: “[E]ach person should have some
private information, even if it’s just an eccentric interpretation of the known facts.”17
Second, members of the crowd must make their decisions independently and not be
influenced by others.18 Third, all decisions should be made based only on the
information available to the individual, and not based on a single, centralized source of
data.19 Fourth, the manager of the market must possess adequate algorithms to aggregate
the predictions and generate accurate results.20
¶15
F.A. Hayek, in discussing the value of spontaneity and local knowledge, postulated
that crowds, acting through markets, are better positioned to make choices than
individuals who lack local knowledge.21 To Hayek, devices such as markets are “orderly
structures which are the product of the action of many men but are not the result of
human design.”22 Surowiecki aimed to show that Hayek’s view on the power of
collective knowledge could be applied beyond descriptions of economic systems.23
¶16
Crowdsourcing, an application of the wisdom of the crowds, was born in a nowfamous Wired magazine article in 2006.24 As defined by its creator, “Crowdsourcing is
the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an
employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form
of an open call.”25 Through crowdsourcing, “[h]obbyists, part-timers, and dabblers
suddenly have a market for their efforts, as smart companies in industries as disparate as
pharmaceuticals and television discover ways to tap the latent talent of the crowd.”26

14

SUROWIECKI, supra note 12 at 3–4.
Note, Prediction Markets and Law: A Skeptical Account, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1217–18 (2009).
16
SUROWIECKI, supra note 12, at 10.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
1 F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: A NEW STATEMENT OF THE LIBERAL PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY, RULES AND ORDER (1973).
22
Josh Chafetz, It’s the Aggregation, Stupid!, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 577, 578 (2005) (quoting HAYEK,
supra note 21, at 37) (reviewing SUROWIECKI, supra note 13).
23
Id. at 578–79.
24
Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED, June 2006, at 177.
25
Jeff Howe, Crowdsourcing: A Definition, CROWDSOURCING, http://crowdsourcing.com (last visited Dec.
29, 2011).
26
Howe, supra note 24, at 179.
15
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B. Prediction Markets
¶17

Building on the wisdom of the crowds, a prediction market, also known as an
information market, encourages people through monetary incentives to aggregate their
collective knowledge and information to predict future events.27 People buy and sell
“contracts,” which effectively assign a price to the likelihood of an event happening.
Several prominent prediction markets sell contracts to members that yield payments
based on the outcome of an uncertain future event,28 such as the outcome of presidential
elections, returns for Hollywood movies,29 and crime forecasting.30 Even “data on past
judicial behavior can be used to build prediction models.”31 The Iowa Electronic
Markets, which pools together predictions about the Presidential election, “has yielded
very accurate predictions and also outperformed large-scale polling organizations.”32
¶18
In a prediction market, the “market price [for the contracts] will be the best
predictor of the event.”33 The incentive to receive a payoff can “elicit the market’s
expectations of a range of different parameters.”34 Prediction markets serve three
primary roles: (1) they create “incentives to seek information”; (2) provide “incentives
for truthful information revelation”; and (3) generate “an algorithm for aggregating
diverse opinions.”35 F.A. Hayek’s writings about markets in general, where the price of
goods is based on a range of information from a large group of people, accurately
describe the nature of prediction markets.36 An important value of prediction markets,
beyond creating a fun forum for competitors to test their soothsaying skills, is their value
as “predictive tools.”37

27

Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 107, 108
(“[P]articipants trade in contracts whose payoff depends on unknown future events.”).
28
Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, Preface to INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING
DECISIONS xi, xi (Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006).
29
See sources cited in Note, supra note 15, at 1218 n.6 (citing, for example, FORESIGHT EXCHANGE,
http://www.ideosphere.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2011); HOLLYWOOD STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.hsx.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2011); INTRADE, http://www.intrade.com (last visited Dec. 4,
2011); IOWA ELECTRONIC MARKETS, http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem (last visited De. 4, 2011), as examples
of prediction markets, as well as Bill Saporito, Place Your Bets!, TIME, Oct. 24, 2005, at 76, for general
information).
30
M. Todd Henderson, Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 20 (2010)
(“[T]he policy-relevant question is not whether prediction markets are accurate predictors of crime rates,
but whether prediction markets yield more accurate crime rate forecasts than alternative approaches.”).
31
Adam M. Samaha, Judicial Transparency in an Age of Prediction, 53 VILL. L. REV. 829, 834 (2008); see
also infra note 131 and accompanying text.
32
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 112; see also Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of
Election Futures Markets Research, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC RESULTS 742 (Charles
R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008).
33
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 108 (“[P]articipants trade in contracts whose payoff depends on
unknown future events.”).
34
Id. at 109.
35
Id. at 125.
36
F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520–26 (1945) (noting that a
price system permits the transfer of collective value of goods by groups, and that value could not be known
by any single member of the group).
37
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 112.
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III. CROWDSOURCING: A SUPREME COURT PREDICTION MARKET
¶19

FantasySCOTUS, built on the collective wisdom of its over 5,000 members, is the
first and only crowdsourced prediction market for the Supreme Court. The rules for
FantasySCOTUS 1.0 were simple.38 Members could make predictions about cases
argued during the October 2009 Term, up until the day the case was decided. When the
Supreme Court announced in advance that opinions would be issued, voting was
disabled. After an opinion was issued, all future voting for that case was disabled.39
¶20
Members made predictions based on eleven parameters. First, members predicted
whether the Supreme Court would affirm or reverse and remand the lower court’s
decision. Members were awarded one point for getting the outcome correct. Second,
members predicted how the Court would split: 9–0 affirm, 8–1 affirm, 7–2 affirm, 6–3
affirm, 5–4 affirm, 5–4 reverse, 6–3 reverse, 7–2 reverse, 8–1 reverse, 9–0 reverse, or
other (including 4–1–4 splits or where less than nine Justices vote). Three points were
awarded for correctly predicting the split. Third, for the remaining nine parameters, the
members predicted whether each of the nine Justices would vote to affirm or reverse and
remand. One point was awarded for each correct prediction. For a single case, members
could earn up to thirteen points.
¶21
In the event that a case was not decided—for example, if certiorari was dismissed
as improvidently granted—no points were awarded. Admittedly, in some cases, the
scoring was difficult. In cases where a Justice voted to affirm in part and reverse in part,
it was often hard to characterize whether it was an affirmance or reversal. In these cases,
the rules provided that the FantasySCOTUS Czar (Josh Blackman) would isolate the
most prominent part of the opinion, and determine whether a Justice voted to affirm or
reverse on that issue. FantasySCOTUS 2.0 has improved rules that clarify the scoring.40
¶22
“The success of prediction markets, like any market, can depend on their design
and implementation.”41 FantasySCOTUS is not a traditional prediction market. It is free
to play,42 contracts are not sold, and buyers are not matched to sellers.43 At its core,
38

Josh Blackman, League Rules, FANTASYSCOTUS.NET, http://www.fantasyscotus.net/rules.html (last
visited Dec. 4, 2011).
39
On several occasions, due to a technical glitch, members were able to change their predictions after a
case was decided but prior to the disabling of the voting feature, and effectively cheated. Those votes were
eliminated, and the offenders were banned from FantasySCOTUS. Josh Blackman, Fantasy Ethics:
Cheating on FantasySCOTUS?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:05 AM),
http://joshblackman.com/blog/?p=4198; see also Note, supra note 15, at 1222 (“Prediction markets are
vulnerable to manipulation, although scholars do not agree on how serious the problem is.”).
40
League Rules, FANTASYSCOTUS, http://www.fantasyscotus.net/league-rules/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2011). The rules for FantasySCOTUS 2.0 are somewhat simpler. Rather than asking users to predict the
overall outcome, and the split, the league asks users to simply predict whether a given Justice would vote to
affirm. Focusing on this level of granularity allows the user to focus on each Justice and the main thrust of
the case, rather than viewing the Court as a whole.
41
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 120.
42
Initially, there was no cost for law students and unemployed attorneys. Those who worked in the public
sector paid a reduced fee. Those in private practice were asked to pay a nominal fee to help with site
maintenance. Midway through the Term, the sign-up fee was eliminated, and everyone could play at no
cost.
43
Some research suggests that prediction markets that do not use real money may actually outperform those
that force people to bet with their own wallets. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 120–21 (“One
intriguing question is how much difference it makes whether prediction markets are run with real money or
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though, it taps a “diversity of information [that] exists in a way that provides a basis for”
predictions.44 Perhaps FantasySCOTUS could be more accurately labeled a “prediction
aggregation mechanism,” a term coined by Professor Michael Abramowicz,45 though for
purposes of this essay, we rely on the broader conception of a prediction market.46
¶23
There are several potential flaws in FantasySCOTUS as a prediction market. First,
some “market participants [may] trade according to their desires, rather than objective
probability assessments.”47 A study suggests that participants in political markets
purchase contracts in a way that reflects their party affiliation.48 While FantasySCOTUS
1.0 did not request that members identify their ideology—we requested this information
in version 2.0, and hope to elaborate on this dynamic in future work—anecdotal evidence
suggests that certain members consistently voted in a manner that reflected a particular
jurisprudential ideology.
¶24
In prediction markets where the “marginal trades are motivated by profits rather
than partisanship, prices will reflect the assessments of (unbiased) profit motive.”49 The
FantasySCOTUS market, which rewarded members with bragging rights—the grand
prize was the coveted “golden gavel trophy”50—rather than profits, may be more
susceptible to such confirmation bias. Where allowing anonymous users to make
predictions without incentives may weaken the accuracy of the prediction market, it may
offer the benefit of enabling a more accurate and honest polling of how the Court is
perceived.51 In other words, when not motivated by a desire to win, users may simply
vote based on their personal preferences of how the Justices should vote—and such data
are quite valuable.
¶25
Second, the outcomes of Supreme Court decisions are secret. Unlike other
prediction markets where people may receive various tips about what will happen (insider
trading of sorts), the votes of the Supreme Court are only known by the Justices, and their
clerks (in the FantasySCOTUS rules, current clerks are banned from playing). Prediction
markets “perform poorly when asked to aggregate closely guarded secret information.”52
Outside of the manner in which the question presented is phrased, discussions during oral
arguments, and the questions the Justices pose, there is generally no inside information as
with some form of play money. . . . However, we do not yet have sufficient comparative data to know the
extent to which money makes predictions more accurate. Indeed, it has been argued that the play money
exchanges may even outperform real-money exchanges because ‘wealth’ can only be accumulated through
a history of accurate prediction. . . . One practical advantage of play money contracts is that they offer
more freedom to experiment with different kinds of contracts.”).
44
Id. at 120.
45
See U.S. Patent No. 7,707,062 B2 (filed May 17, 2007) (discussing a “prediction aggregation
mechanism”).
46
See generally Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Tiresias and the Justices: Using Information
Markets to Predict Supreme Court Decisions, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2006).
47
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 118.
48
Robert Forsythe et al., Wishes, Expectations and Actions: A Survey on Price Formation in Election Stock
Markets, 39 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 83, 89–93 (1999).
49
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 118.
50
The October Term 2009 Golden Gavel Trophy, FANTASYSCOTUS,
http://www.fantasyscotus.net/news/the-october-term-2009-golden-gavel-trophy/ (last visited Dec. 28,
2011).
51
See infra Part VII-A.
52
Note, supra note 15, at 1225.
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to how the Justices will vote.53 This is an inherent weakness in FantasySCOTUS—and
Supreme Court prediction markets generally—that could not be alleviated, short of
someone with personal knowledge leaking information to the public.
¶26
Third, general criticisms of prediction markets apply equally to FantasySCOTUS.
According to one critical account, “Enthusiasm for ‘many minds’ arguments has infected
legal academia.”54 Academics “now champion the virtues of groupthink, something once
thought to have only vices.”55 With respect to legal prediction markets, the criticism is
somewhat more acute: “[T]he circumstances in which prediction markets are inaccurate
are precisely the circumstances in which law needs them most.”56 Specifically, “the
performance of prediction markets is inversely correlated with how valuable their
predictions would be.”57 If an event in the future, such as the President’s nominee for the
Supreme Court “is secret or knowledge about its likelihood is thin, . . . a prediction
market will probably not produce accurate information.”58
¶27
Predictors “tend to overvalue small probabilities and undervalue near certainties,”
and “prediction markets may perform poorly at predicting small probability events.”59
“Most intractable legal informational problems involve a kind of uncertainty—whether
secret, idiosyncratic, or catastrophic—not susceptible to aggregation through a market
mechanism.”60 Perhaps “information markets can improve knowledge in other areas, and
so indirectly improve legal decisionmaking, but this role for information markets in law
is considerably more niche-like than recent scholarly enthusiasm would imply.”61
Notwithstanding these potential shortcomings, FantasySCOTUS illustrates that a legal
prediction market can be accurate, reliable, and useful to the academic community, and
society at large. For a number of cases, where the conventional thinking pointed to one
outcome—what some may call a near certainty—FantasySCOTUS was able to discern
the “small probability” vote that was generally unforeseen by experts.
As
FantasySCOTUS develops, these legitimate concerns about prediction markets will
hopefully be assuaged.
IV. TESTING THE WISDOM OF FANTASYSCOTUS
¶28

In order to assess the predictive power of FantasySCOTUS, we devised two
frameworks. The first test was internal. We compared the predictions of the
FantasySCOTUS power predictors—those that made predictions for more than seventyfive percent of the cases—with the FantasySCOTUS crowd—those that made predictions
for less than seventy-five percent of the cases. With this data we could not conclude that
the power predictors were superior to the crowd. In other words, while we were not able

53

Id. (“The outcomes that judges would most like to predict are naturally those about which little is already
known. In the legal context, thinness of information often results from secrecy.”).
54
Id. at 1217.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 1218.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 117.
60
Note, supra note 15, at 1238.
61
Id.
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to prove that that the crowd was just as good as the power predictors, we were able to
reject the alternative hypothesis that the power predictors were simply better.
¶29
The second test was external.
We compared the predictions of the
FantasySCOTUS power predictors with the experts from the Supreme Court Forecasting
Project, which we used as a baseline. With this approach, the diverse power predictor
posse, in contrast with the largely homogenous credentialed experts from the Forecasting
Project, permitted a statistically significant comparison to determine whether the wisdom
of the crowds could trump the experts. The power predictors outperformed the
Forecasting Project’s experts, though the results were not statistically significant. Next,
we compared the accuracy of the power predictors with the accuracy of the decision tree
developed by the Forecasting Project. This approach allowed us to weigh the wisdom of
the crowds against the power of Super Cruncher algorithms. In this case, the decision
tree surpassed the accuracy of all but the best power predictors.62
A. Methodology
¶30

Over 5,000 members made nearly 11,000 predictions for all eighty-one cases
decided during the October 2009 Term. Predictions consisted of eleven data points: the
outcome of the case (affirm or reverse), the split (9–0 affirm, 8–1 affirm, 7–2 affirm, 6–3
affirm, 5–4 affirm, 5–4 reverse, 6–3 reverse, 7–2 reverse, 8–1 reverse, 9–0 reverse, and
other, including 4–1–4 splits), and the votes for each of the nine Justices (affirm or
reverse and remand). The analysis in this essay only focuses on the outcome of the case.
Whether the Court affirmed or reversed the lower court, as opposed to the numerous
splits and individual votes of the Justices, is the simplest metric to compare.
¶31
Analyzing thousands of data points required focusing on some aspect of the
predictions. We decided to focus on the ten most important cases—rather than all eightyone cases, many of which received very few predictions, and lacked statistical
significance—to focus the analysis. Rather than engaging in a debate about what cases
were “most important” from a normative perspective, we decided—relying on a
crowdsourced approach—that the users would be the best judge of what cases mattered
the most. Using the total number of predictions for each case as a measurement of
popularity is particularly valuable because it does not require value judgments to
determine what data matter most. The metric itself is created directly from the data set
with no transformation or processing. For the purposes of the discussion, the top ten
most predicted cases will be listed in descending order, from the case with the most
predictions to the case with the least predictions.
¶32
First, in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the Court held that
Congress may not prohibit corporations and unions from making independent
expenditures, which are protected speech under the First Amendment.63 It was by far the
most popular case of the Term: 901 members made predictions for Citizens United. The
second most predicted case was United States v. Stevens, in which the Court struck down
as unconstitutional a federal statute that criminalized the depiction of animal cruelty.64
Third was Maryland v. Shatzer, where the Court held that police may properly question a
62

See infra Table 4.
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
64
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
63
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suspect who requests a lawyer, is then released, and a couple weeks later waives his right
to a lawyer.65 Fourth was Johnson v. United States, in which the Court held that a prior
felony does not constitute a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act when
the prior felony did not require the government to prove the use of force.66 Fifth was
Padilla v. Kentucky, where the Court found that effective assistance of counsel to an
undocumented worker requires advising him or her that a guilty plea may lead to a
deportation.67 Sixth, in Graham v. Florida, the Court determined that a life sentence
without parole for a non-capital juvenile defendant violates the Eight Amendment.68
Seventh, in Bloate v. United States, the Court interpreted the Speedy Trial Act to not
automatically exclude time for preparing pretrial motions; rather, the time is only
excluded if the Court finds that such a delay serves justice.69 Eighth, in McDonald v.
City of Chicago, the Court held that the individual Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms also applies to the states.70 Ninth, in Perdue v. Kenny A., the Court found that
higher than normal attorney’s fees in a civil rights case are permissible only in
extraordinary circumstances.71 Tenth, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Court held that the Patent
Act covers patentable subject matter that falls outside of the machine or transformation
test.72
B. Defining the Power Predictors and the Crowd
¶33

To internally test the validity of the wisdom of the crowds—and whether crowds
can outperform those with certain aptitudes—we focused on two groups of
FantasySCOTUS members: the power predictors and the crowd. Power predictors were
not selected on the basis of correctness, but rather unknowingly selected themselves by
making predictions for more than seventy-five percent of the cases argued during the
October 2009 Term (sixty-one out of the eighty-one cases). This group consisted of
thirty members. The remaining FantasySCOTUS players—those who made predictions
for less than seventy-five percent of the cases—are dubbed the crowd.
¶34
We chose not to simply pick the users with the highest accuracy rates because that
would make the comparison meaningless. Picking the highest scorers would, by
definition, ensure that they performed better than the crowd. Rather, we relied on the
percentage of predictions as a measure of how invested users were in their predictions.
Users who predicted more cases—the more popular cases as well as the obscure, less
popular cases—likely devoted more effort towards predicting cases. FantasySCOTUS’

65

Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010).
Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010).
67
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
68
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
69
Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010).
70
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); see also Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping
Pandora’s Box Sealed: Privileges or Immunities, the Constitution in 2020, and Properly Extending the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms to the States, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–22 (2010) (discussing
McDonald); Alan Gura, Ilya Shapiro & Josh Blackman, Extending the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: The
Tell-Tale Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 163 (2010).
71
Perdue v. Kenny A., 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
72
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
66
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top three power predictors—those who made predictions for 75.7% of the cases—
collectively fell only one prediction short of offering predictions for all of the cases.
The composition of the power predictor posse is quite varied, and members fell into
five general types of members.73 First, a number of power predictors had some Supreme
Court experience, mostly with writing amicus briefs in law school Supreme Court clinics.
The most accomplished player, solo practitioner David Mills,74 successfully argued and
won Ortiz v. Jordan.75 Second, a few power predictors were professors—both of law and
political science. One taught as an Associate Professor at Columbia Law School, another
as a Political Science Professor at Rice University. Third, the vast majority of power
predictors were law students and new attorneys. Most notable among this group was the
champion, “Chief Justice” Justin Donoho,76 who recently graduated from the University
of Chicago, worked as a law clerk on the Seventh Circuit, and served as a research
assistant to Judge Richard A. Posner.77 Other top student power predictors attended
Southern Illinois School of Law, Vermont Law School, and the University of Tulsa.
Fourth, some power predictors were attorneys who lacked appellate experience.
One member in this group has a small general practice firm with his wife in Alabama.
Finally, the most interesting group of power predictors consisted of players who had no
formal legal training and never attended law school. One of the best players is an actuary
who never attended law school and, quite impressively, taught himself constitutional law
in high school.
He was the “Chief Justice” of the October 2010 Term of
FantasySCOTUS.78 The eighth-ranked player never attended law school and works as an
air traffic controller. The eighteenth-ranked player is not a lawyer and earned a degree in
Geophysical Engineering from Montana Tech.
Admittedly, our selection of the power predictors is somewhat flawed in that they
were selected ex post. As a practical matter, we had no other choice. There was no way
to select a group of top players ex ante in the first season of FantasySCOTUS, when
everyone started with a collective score of zero. Similarly, setting the prediction level at
seventy-five percent was arbitrary, as we had no other historical baseline to rely on. Any
accuracy derived from the increased participation was not deliberate on our part, although
incidentally our power predictors effectively overlapped with the top-ranked players.
As our analysis suggests, we can state to a degree of statistical significance that the
power predictors’ results were not based on chance—that is, predicting that every case
the Court hears would be reversed, for example, with hopes of guessing one’s way to a
high score. For the second season, however, the top performers (those with the most
73

Some, but not all of the power predictors responded to a survey inquiring about who they were and how
they made predictions. Some of those who responded requested various degrees of anonymity. For a
detailed discussion of who they are and how they made their predictions, see Josh Blackman, Who Are the
FantasySCOTUS Experts and How Do They Make Predictions?, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (May 4, 2011,
11:14 PM), http://joshblackman.com/blog/?p=6875.
74
Mark Curriden, The Long Shot, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2010, at 52.
75
See Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011).
76
Congratulations to Justin Donoho, the Chief Justice of FantasySCOTUS OT2009, FANTASYSCOTUS,
http://www.fantasyscotus.net/?p=94 (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
77
Id.
78
Josh Blackman, JoshCast: Interview with Jacob Berlove, Chief Justice of FantasySCOTUS OT 2010,
JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (July 5, 2011, 9:01 AM), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2011/07/05/joshcastinterview-with-justice-donoho-chief-justice-of-fantasyscotus-ot-2010/.
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accurate predictions) from the first season who returned are designated as repeat power
predictors. We are interested to see how repeat performers do. In future work, we will
select the next generation of power predictors.
C. Comparing the Power Predictors and the Crowd
¶39

We compared the accuracy of the crowd with the accuracy of the power predictors
using two tests. First, we compared the outcome accuracy rate of the two tests—that is,
whether they correctly predicted that the Court would affirm or reverse a case—as a
percentage. This approach allowed us to focus on one clear metric, the outcome.
Second, we considered all parameters of the prediction—the outcome, the split, and the
votes to the individual Justices—and compared the total scores of the crowd and the
power predictors. This approach provides a more comprehensive analysis to see how
granular and detailed the accuracy of the crowd is—it is much more difficult to predict
the individual votes than to simply predict an overall affirm or reverse outcome. Based
on these two approaches, we could not conclude that the power predictors’ predictions
were superior to those of the crowd, supporting the validity of the wisdom of the crowds.
1. Accuracy of Forecasting the Outcome

¶40

Table 1 presents the outcome of each case, the crowd to power predictor ratio, the
accuracy of the crowd,79 whether it was significant,80 the power predictor accuracy rate,
whether it was significant, and the date of oral arguments.
TABLE 1. GENERAL GROUP STATISTICS

Crowd-toPower
Case
Outcome
Predictor
Ratio
Citizens Reverse
24.743
United
Stevens Affirm
16.135

Crowd
Accuracy

Outcome
Sig.

Power Predictor
Accuracy

Outcome
Sig.

Number of
Predictions

Oral
Argume
nts Date

61%

Yes (99%)

71%

Yes (99%)

901

9/9/09

83%

Yes (99%)

92%

Yes (99%)

634

10/6/09

15.946

50%

No

65%

Yes (90%)

627

10/5/09

Johnson Reverse

6.868

45%

No

50%

No

299

10/6/09

Padilla

Reverse

7.027

38%

Yes (99%)

35%

Yes (90%)

297

10/13/09

McDon
ald

Reverse

6.459

66%

Yes (99%)

65%

Yes (99%)

276

3/2/10

Shatzer

Reverse

79

The accuracy rate, expressed as a percentage, represents the percentage of each group that correctly
predicted the outcome of a case.
80
We calculated whether each of the outcomes—crowd and power predictors—was statistically significant,
based on confidence intervals. In statistics, the determination of reliability—that is, how likely the data
express a clear outcome (affirm or reverse)—can be specified based on various confidence intervals. The
most commonly used intervals, 90%, 95%, and 99%, are sorted in increasing reliability. A 99% confidence
level, the gold standard of statistical measures, indicates that the sample results are most reliable. In
contrast, 95% and, even more so, 90% confidence intervals express that the data are less likely to be
reliable. Each group is independently above the threshold for the Central Limit Theorem. The larger the
crowd, the more accurate the results are.
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Graham Reverse

5.486

49%

No

60%

No

240

11/9/09

Bloate

Reverse

5.405

20%

Yes (99%)

32%

Yes (95%)

237

10/6/09

Perdue

Reverse

4.514

57%

Yes (90%)

62%

No

204

10/14/09

Bilski

Affirm

4.270

80%

Yes (99%)

78%

Yes (99%)

195

11/9/09

¶41

Due to the novelty of the data set, we created a custom decision rule to determine if
each group, as a whole, was correct (or incorrect) above a certain threshold. A
confidence interval is a range where the values of the test statistics—in FantasySCOTUS,
the affirm or reverse percentage—may differ due to statistical noise.81 Statistical noise
could manifest as uncertainty introduced through sampling.82 A determination was
reliable when the confidence interval did not include 50%, meaning that enough
predictions for either affirm or reverse were—for statistical purposes—in agreement with
the direction of the outcome such that we could reliably assess the prediction at a given
confidence interval. This analysis yields a definitive affirm or reverse decision for the
group. Otherwise, the predictions would not be conclusive for affirmation or reversal.
¶42
The data suggest several statistically significant trends. First, the number of
predictions made roughly tracked the date of oral arguments. The earlier the case was
argued, the more predictions were made. Generally, members made predictions
following oral arguments. On November 11, 2009 when FantasySCOTUS launched and
went viral, Citizens United, Stevens, and Shatzer, the three cases with the highest crowdpower predictor ratio—which received 901, 634, and 627 predictions, respectively—had
already been argued. However, McDonald, a landmark Second Amendment case not
argued until March 2, 2010—nearly four months after FantasySCOTUS launched—
received only 277 predictions. It seems that the number of predictions dropped off over
the course of the Supreme Court Term, and web traffic analytics anecdotally support this
conclusion.
¶43
Cases argued later in the Term had fewer members of the crowd make predictions.
Yet the dedicated detail of power predictors voted consistently throughout the Term.
Additionally, the accuracy of the predictions seems to indicate that the weakest predictors
of the crowd left at an early stage. In this sense, cases argued later in the Term had a
more reliable set of predictors.
¶44
Second, there was an interesting interplay between the statistical significance of the
data and the accuracy of the resulting predictions. Statistical significance must be
distinguished from accuracy. Significance refers to how reliable the data are, while
accuracy refers to how correct the data are—the difference between precision and
correctness.83 For all cases, in light of the smaller sample size, the power predictor group
had a larger confidence interval—meaning more statistical noise and less reliable results.
Yet, the power predictor group still provided more accurate results. Conversely, the
81

B.S. EVERITT, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF STATISTICS 86 (2d ed. rev. 2003) (“Confidence interval:
A range of values, calculated from the sample observations, that are believed, with a particular probability,
to contain the true parameter value.”).
82
Id. at 332 (“Sampling error: The difference between the sample result and the population characteristic
being estimated. In practice, the sampling error can rarely be determined because the population
characteristic is not usually known.”).
83
JOINT COMM. FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY, INTERNATIONAL VOCABULARY OF METROLOGY—BASIC AND
GENERAL CONCEPTS AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 21–22 (2008).
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crowd had a smaller confidence interval—less statistical noise and more reliable
results—but produced less accurate results. This illustrates the difference between
reliability viz. statistical significance and accuracy. The crowd was more reliably wrong,
meaning that, while the results were a reliable expression of the crowd’s predictions,
those predictions were inaccurate. In contrast, the power predictor group was less
reliable but more accurate.
¶45
The predictions for eight of the ten cases, excluding Johnson and Graham, were
statistically significant. In this context, statistical significance means that the data show a
definitive affirm or reverse outcome according to our decision rule. For Johnson and
Graham, which were not statistically significant, the prediction data for affirm and
reverse are statistically 50/50—equally likely to generate an affirm or reverse result—and
thus were inconclusive. The prediction data for Padilla and Bloate provide for
statistically significant results, yet the ultimate affirm-or-reverse predictions were
incorrect. For the remaining six cases, which were decided correctly, the prediction data
provide for statistically significant results.
¶46
For Shatzer, the power predictor group’s predictions proved statistically significant,
while the crowd’s predictions were not statistically significant. This split represents an
exception to the rule, because generally, a smaller sample size (power predictors) would
not be statistically significant, whereas a larger sample size (crowd) would be statistically
significant. Here, the power predictor group (thirty members) was more statistically
significant than the crowd (about 590 members). This suggests that, for Shatzer, the
power predictor group was more reliable—that is, a decisive consensus existed with
respect to the affirm or reverse outcome.
2. Accuracy of Forecasting Outcome, Split, and Individual Votes
¶47

Members of FantasySCOTUS made predictions for the outcome, split, and
individual votes of each Justice. A perfect score was thirteen.84 Table 2 calculates two
averages for each case—the average score for each member of the power predictor group
(Power Predictor Average Points) and the average score each member of the crowd
(Crowd Average Points). For each average, we calculated the standard deviation.85 As
an additional measure of statistical difference between the two groups, we calculated the
Welch’s t-test.86 To measure overall performance (that is, how each group performed
84

See supra Part III.
The standard deviation for each average reveals how individual scores—that is, the votes of individual
members in each group—were distributed around the average. Standard deviation is a common statistic
used to measure the spread of data points within a sample. EVERITT, supra note 81, at 360. The standard
deviation is equal to the square root of the variance. Id. For example, if the average score was nine and the
standard deviation was one, that would indicate that a certain number of members, within one standard
deviation, scored between eight and ten points. A larger standard deviation indicates that there was a
greater spread from the average for members in that group as a total.
86
If two data points are significantly different, that suggests that the difference is not due to statistical noise
or randomness. A Welch’s t-test, using standard deviation, determines whether the two averages were
significantly different from each other. We indicated if the results were statistically significant, and
whether the confidence level was 90%, 95%, or 99%. See generally B.L. Welch, The Generalization of
‘Student’s’ Problem When Several Different Population Variances Are Involved, 34 BIOMETRIKA 28
(1947). A t-test is a commonly used statistical test to determine if two samples are significantly different
through hypothesis testing. A Welch’s t-test is appropriate in this case, due to its relaxed assumptions, and
85
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over all the cases), we averaged together each individual average from the ten cases—in
other words, it is an average of the averages. Based on this average, we calculated the
overall standard deviation for each classification.
TABLE 2. AVERAGE SCORES
Crowd
Case

Average
Points

Power Predictor
Standard
Deviation

Average
Points

Standard
Deviation

Significant?
(Welch’s t-test)

Citizens United

8.62

4.16

9

4.22

No

Stevens

8.17

2.53

8.57

2.23

No

Shatzer

6.9

1.86

8.11

2.55

Yes (99%)

Johnson

6.18

2.41

7.08

2.97

Yes (90%)

Padilla

5.65

2.48

6.08

2.61

No

McDonald

9.17

3.5

9.68

2.99

No

Graham

5.42

3.07

6.49

2.91

Yes (95%)

Bloate

6.56

1.38

6.81

1.58

No

Perdue

6.65

2.86

6.75

2.86

No

Bilski

9.22

3.34

10.68

3.1

Yes (95%)

Avg. of Avg.

7.25

1.43

7.93

1.53

No

¶48

For all ten cases, the average member of the power predictor group scored more
points than the average member of the crowd. The power predictor average, 7.93 points,
was higher than the crowd average, 7.25 points. The biggest difference was in Bilski,
where the power predictor group scored on average 10.68 points, while the crowd group
on average scored only 9.22 points, a difference of 1.46. The case with the least
difference was Perdue, where the power predictor group scored on average 6.75 points,
while the crowd group on average scored only 6.65 points, a difference of 0.1.
¶49
While members of the power predictor group scored more points on average, they
generally had a higher standard deviation—in other words, a larger point spread—around
that average than members of the crowd group. Using Shatzer as a typical example, the
standard deviation of the power predictor group was 2.55, more than 33% greater than the
1.86 standard deviation of the crowd group. This indicates some uncertainty within the
power predictors’ forecasts. Perhaps power predictors, convinced of their individual
views of the case, are more likely to buck trends and make less conventional predictions
about individual Justice behavior. The crowd tends to be more unified in this sense;
adhering to conventional views of how the Justices will vote perhaps indicates that
crowds are more influenced by media coverage.87

does not require that the variance within a sample be the same. Without the data set, we could not ensure
that the variance would be the same between different samples.
87
See infra Part VI-A.
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The Welch’s t-test in six of the ten cases yielded no significant results. That is, in
six of the ten cases the crowd was just as likely as the power predictors to predict the
correct outcome. Further, in light of the extensive media coverage of Citizens United,
Stevens, and McDonald,88 any informational advantage the power predictors might have
had over the crowd was minimized. For Shatzer, Johnson, and Graham, the difference
between the two groups was significant. In these cases, the power predictors may have
had insight that the crowd did not—perhaps they gleaned some clue from oral arguments
that the media overlooked or discerned how the Justices would vote from the arguments
in the briefs.
3. Analysis

¶51

The results do not conclusively prove that the power predictors’ forecasts were
superior to those of the crowd. Although the power predictors generally do better, the
crowd is able to make rather strong predictions to bridge the gap. This lends support to
the wisdom of the crowds theory, wherein a larger pool of predictors with a broader range
of knowledge can often predict as well, if not better, than knowledgeable individuals.
¶52
However, this does not hold true for all cases. In the marginal cases, the crowd
performs well, but just not as well as the power predictors do. Generally, the power
predictors make more informed predictions, although the predictions lack high levels of
accuracy.89 The lack of precision could very well reflect a professional hubris of sorts.
With too much knowledge, and perhaps over-confidence, the power predictors may have
second-guessed conventional wisdom, and prudence. In contrast, the crowd is more
unified in its results, and perhaps influenced by extensive media coverage of the cases.90
In this respect, the power predictors exhibit some of the flaws particular to experts, and
these results demonstrate how a crowd can smooth out these errors.91 In summary, the
power predictors are only better predictors in the marginal case. FantasySCOTUS’ wise
crowds are about as accurate as the power predictors, meaning individuals who only
make a few predictions, when aggregated, were almost as accurate as those who made
many predictions.
4. Insulating Results from Randomness
¶53

Our statistical modeling, combined with the disparate nature of the Supreme Court
docket, helps to mitigate the risk of randomness weakening the reliability of the
comparisons and trends. The outcome of one case, generally, will not affect the outcome
of a second case (unless they are precedentially related). For example, United States v.
Stevens, decided early in the Term, had no impact on Bilski v. Kappos, decided at the end
of the Term. These cases are independent trials—the voting in past cases has no impact

88

See infra Part VI-A.
Blackman, supra note 73 (discussing the sources power predictors rely on to make their decisions).
90
Id.
91
MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION
MAKING 38 (2007) (Aggregated data may “in part cancel out random errors that individuals make in
predictions by overweighing or underweighing particular pieces of evidence.”).
89
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on the voting in future unrelated cases.92 Or, to put it another way, flipping a coin once
has no impact on flipping the coin a second time.93
¶54
When comparing a user’s performance to a possible random performance—flipping
a coin for every prediction—we consider the cumulative results of individual votes,
rather than the overall score.94 In other words, we count the number of times a coin
landed on the correct side, rather than the total number of heads or tails. Because the
cases are independent due to the different legal doctrines and factual predicates, it is
much harder for a user to randomly make predictions to obtain a high score over the
course of the entire Supreme Court Term with eighty-one cases decided by the same set
of Justices. Specifically, where we presented data we indicated whether they were
significant and at what confidence level (90%, 95%, or 99%). With data at these
confidence levels, we were able to assert that the result was not due to randomness or
chance.
¶55
Our methodologies also prevent a statistical “quasi-miracle,”95 whereby users could
randomly predict all of the cases accurately. Assume an infinite number of monkeys
were stationed at FantasySCOTUS iPads, randomly making predictions,96 and obtained a
perfect score. A single primate, let’s call him Ape Fortas, would need to correctly predict
each and every case. The odds of Ape Fortas accomplishing this task are infinitesimally
small.97 Even 5,000 (the number of FantasySCOTUS players) apes mashing away on
five-thousand monkey-friendly iPads would not increase the odds of any one player
predicting all of the cases correctly. This small sample size is not even close to the same

92

STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A MODERN APPROACH 477–79 (2d ed.
2003) (discussing the various forms of independence used in decision making and probability theory).
93
Formally, coin flips belong to a class of stochastic processes called Bernoulli processes, which use a
constant probability of binary outcomes in multiple trials. CHARLES M. GRINSTEAD & J. LAURIE SNELL,
INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY 96–97 (2d rev. ed. 1998), available at
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~chance/teaching_aids/books_articles/probability_book/amsbook.mac.pdf.
94
A binomial distribution is the creation of a probability distribution depending on constant probability, the
number of trials, and the number of successes to determine the likelihood of conditional outcomes.
Michelle Lacey, The Binomial Distribution, YALE U. DEPARTMENT STAT.,
http://www.stat.yale.edu/Courses/1997-98/101/binom.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
95
Quasi-miracles are thought of as the logical equivalent of denying the existent of absolutes, i.e. objects
always fall towards the ground or a series of a million coin flips will come up heads. For practical
purposes, such events are extremely rare, but are an important part of logical statements. See J. Robert G.
Williams, Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity, 77 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 385, 389
(2008).
96
The earliest mention of the monkey thought experiment, where one of an infinite number of monkeys,
pounding away at typewriters, produces the complete works of Shakespeare, was introduced by Émile
Borel, a French mathematician in 1913. Émile Borel, La Mécanique Statique et L’irréversibilité [Static
Mechanics and Irriversibility], 3 JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE THÉORIQUE ET APPLIQUÉE [J. PHYS.] 189 (1913)
(Fr.).
97
Richard Dawkins lays out the probability of writing a twenty-eight character sentence from Shakespeare
by a monkey on a typewriter with just the twenty-six letters and the spacebar as (1/27)28. RICHARD
DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION REVEALS A UNIVERSE WITHOUT
DESIGN 46–47 (3d ed. 1996). The monkey has a 1 in 27 chance of getting each character right, but must get
the characters correct in sequence, causing the exponential probability. Id. at 47. In our case, Ape Fortas
would face the odds of (1/2)61 (sixty-one represents 75% of the eighty-one cases decided). Although this
number is much larger than the monkey’s odds, it would still be highly unlikely to occur.
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order of magnitude to compare with all those prescient prognosticating primates.98 The
approach we used attempted to insulate the data from logical and statistical problems of
randomness. Further, at the conclusion of the Term we verified that no member of
FantasySCOTUS made predictions by selecting reverse for every case, thus confirming
that predictions were not made randomly, at least using this strategy.
D. The Supreme Court Forecasting Project
¶56

In a path-breaking article, a group of legal and political science “Super
Crunchers”99 developed a decision tree model, based on the prior decisions of the nine
Justices, to predict outcomes of Supreme Court cases during the October 2002 Term.100
The article compared those outcomes to the predictions of a group of experts.101 The
Project’s decision tree did not consider the legal merits of a particular case. Instead the
authors based their model on six variables:102 (1) the case’s circuit, or lower court, of
origin; (2) issue area of the case;103 (3) type of appellant;104 (4) type of respondent;105 (5)
98

One programmer was able to recreate the complete works of Shakespeare at random using a few million
virtual monkeys. Jesse Anderson, A Few Million Monkeys Randomly Recreate Shakespeare, JESSE
ANDERSON BLOG (Sept. 23, 2011), http://www.jesse-anderson.com/2011/09/a-few-million-monkeysrandomly-recreate-shakespeare/.
99
AYRES, supra note 5, at 10 (“Super Crunchers . . . have analyzed large datasets to discover empirical
correlations between seemingly unrelated things.”).
100
See Ruger et al., supra note 4.
101
See Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1154–55.
102
Id. at 1163. The variables the Project utilized were based on the Supreme Court database definitions,
which provide coding corresponding to each variable. Id. at 1163 n.45. The coding is too extensive to be
replicated in the footnotes, but is available on the Supreme Court Database’s website. See HAROLD SPAETH
ET AL., SUPREME COURT DATABASE CODE BOOK: 2011 RELEASE 01, at 1, 12, 14, 20, 27, 35, 44 (2011),
available at http://scdb.wustl.edu/_brickFiles/2011_01/SCDB_2011_01_codebook.pdf.
103
See SPAETH ET AL., supra note 102, at 35. There are too many issue areas to list (fourteen), but as an
example, the ten cases discussed above have the following issue areas, as coded in the data available at
SUPREME CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu: Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (First Amendment); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (First Amendment); Maryland
v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (criminal procedure); Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010)
(criminal procedure); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (criminal procedure); Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (criminal procedure); Bloate v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (2010) (criminal
procedure); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (criminal procedure); Perdue v. Kenny
A., 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010) (attorneys); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (economic activity).
104
See SPAETH ET AL., supra note 102, at 12 (explaining the “petitioner” variable as referring to the party
who petitioned the Supreme Court). Again, the types of appellants are too numerous to list (300), but for
the ten cases discussed, the types of appellants as coded in the database include: Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.
876 (political candidate, activist, committee, party, party member, organization, or elected official);
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (United States); Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (state); Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 1265
(defendant); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (alien, person subject to a denaturalization proceeding, or one whose
citizenship is revoked); Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (juvenile); Bloate, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (defendant);
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (resident); Perdue, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (government official, or an official of an
agency established under an interstate compact); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (inventor, patent assigner,
trademark owner or holder).
105
See SPAETH ET AL., supra note 102, at 14. Again, the types of respondents are too numerous to list (this
variable uses the same coding as types of appellants), but for the ten cases discussed, the type of
respondents as coded in the database include: Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (Federal Election
Commission); Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (person convicted of a crime); Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (defendant);
Johnson, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (United States); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (state); Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (state);
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ideological direction of the lower court ruling (liberal or conservative, however
nebulously that is defined);106 and (6) whether the petitioner argued that a law or practice
being challenged was unconstitutional.107 The decision tree works by starting with a
question, such as “Is the lower court decision liberal?,” and based on whether the answers
to the questions are yes or no, the tree predicts how a Justice would vote.108
¶57
After members of the project manually coded the value of each of these variables
for all cases argued during the October 2002 Term, the model predicted the vote for each
Justice based upon the decision tree.109 The model scanned for numeric patterns rather
than considering the merits of the case, a Super Cruncher algorithm that differs from the
way that the experts considered cases. The trees ultimately yielded an affirm or reverse
vote for each case.110
¶58
To test the accuracy of the decision tree model, the authors vetted and recruited a
coterie of reputable Supreme Court followers. They selected these experts based on
factors including writing, experience,111 appellate practice before the Court,112 and
Supreme Court clerkships.113 At the conclusion of the October 2002 Term, the authors
compared the results from the Super Crunching decision-tree model114 and the experts.
Their model predicted 75% of the cases correctly, which was more accurate than their
experts (a sample size of three) who only predicted 59.1% of the cases correctly.115
¶59
The authors provided a number of reasons to explain this result, such as the fact
that the model predicted the economic activity cases much better than the experts.116 The
main factor, unsurprisingly, was the ability of the decision tree to predict the votes of
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy.117 The Project’s authors noted that the “model seems to
have captured patterns in [Justice O’Connor’s] decisional behavior that the experts did
not recognize.”118 Generally, lawyers can use “their experience along with traditional
methods of legal analysis such as logic, analogy, and statutory interpretation to predict
Bloate, 130 S. Ct. 1345 (United States); McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (city, town, township, village, or
borough government or governmental unit); Perdue, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (child, children, including adopted or
illegitimate); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (Department or Secretary of Commerce).
106
See SPAETH ET AL., supra note 102, at 27.
107
Id. at 44.
108
See, e.g., Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1166 fig.1.
109
Id. at 1163–67.
110
See id.
111
Id. at 1168.
112
Id. at 1178 (“The practicing attorneys who participated in [the Supreme Court Forecasting Project] are
appellate lawyers who appear regularly before the Supreme Court. Prediction of Supreme Court outcomes,
in order to advise clients and develop litigation strategies, is an important element of their professional
role.”). Unfortunately, the authors did not list the identity of their “experts.” The effect that lack of
anonymity may have on an expert’s willingness to publicly declare her predictions—and thereby open
herself up to criticism if the prediction turned out to be incorrect—is unclear.
113
Id. at 1168.
114
AYRES, supra note 5, at 10 (noting that Super Crunching “is statistical analysis that impacts real-world
decisions”).
115
See, e.g., Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1171.
116
Id. at 1175. According to the Supreme Court Database codebook, “Economic activity is largely
commercial and business related; it includes tort actions and employee actions vis-a-vis employers.”
SPAETH ET AL., supra note 102, at 34.
117
Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1172–75.
118
Id. at 1173.
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case outcomes for their clients.”119 However, statistical models, such as the decision tree
used in the Forecasting project “often turn out to be better crystal balls than traditional
experts.”120
E. Comparing the Power Predictors and the Forecasting Project
¶60

This section compares the accuracy of the FantasySCOTUS power predictors and
crowd with the Supreme Court Forecasting Project’s experts and the decision tree. The
power predictors predicted 64.7% of the cases correctly, surpassing the Forecasting
Project’s Experts (59.1%), though the difference was not statistically significant. During
the October 2002 Term, the Project’s model predicted 75% of the cases correctly, which
was more accurate than all but the most accurate power predictors (those who had an
average accuracy rate of 75.7%).
1. Of Experts and Crowds

¶61

Comparisons between the Forecasting Project’s experts and the FantasySCOTUS
power predictors are imprecise for several reasons. First, the FantasySCOTUS data set is
derived exclusively from a crowdsourced prediction market. We did not develop any
predictive model nor did we vet any experts. Unlike the “experts” selected in the
Forecasting Project—mostly appellate litigators, former Supreme Court clerks, and
professors—the FantasySCOTUS power predictors unknowingly selected themselves by
predicting more than seventy-five percent of the cases.
¶62
When comparing the power predictors with the Forecasting Project’s experts, we
are not comparing two similar groups. The former is effectively a crowd, while the latter
is a group of specialized experts with largely similar experience and education. Though
the subset of only three members reduces the sample size, the composition of the power
predictors meets the minimum size required for the statistical measures we used, and can
statistically be considered a crowd.121 Empirically, this selection approximates a normal
distribution, and is still valid.
¶63
Another manner in which the power predictors differed concerned the scope of
cases predicted. In the Forecasting Project, the experts were subject-matter experts—that
is, they made predictions in case areas they were familiar with, such as corporate law,
criminal law, constitutional law, and so on. Only three of the eighty-three experts in the
Forecasting Project made predictions for most of the cases. FantasySCOTUS had a
stable thirty-member cadre of power predictors that predicted a majority of the cases,
from a noteworthy Second Amendment case to a less popular original jurisdiction water
rights case. The power predictors’ wide breadth of knowledge and experience—from
Supreme Court advocate to actuary—drew from a diverse crowd with a combined
wisdom that yielded a respectable accuracy rate.

119

Edward K. Cheng, Will Quants Rule the (Legal) World?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 967, 975 (2009).
Id.
121
When using statistics, most measures assume a normal distribution, which is technically very rare.
When dealing with groups, however, the central limit theorem states that as the sample size increases, the
sample more closely approximates a normal distribution. See EVERITT, supra note 81, at 64.
120
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2. Analysis
¶64

It was impossible to compare FantasySCOTUS’ data and the Forecasting Project’s
data directly. The Forecasting Project looked at the October 2002 Term and
FantasySCOTUS considered the October 2009 Term. There were different cases,
different arguments, and, perhaps most significantly, different Justices. Indeed, the
ability to utilize a significant amount of data concerning that Court’s prior decisions was
part of the rationale underlying the Project’s model, which had an unprecedented
consistent membership for nearly a decade.122
¶65
FantasySCOTUS data are based on the Court’s October 2009 Term, which was a
brand-new natural court123 with the addition of Justice Sotomayor and the departure of
Justice Souter.124 Also, the rest of the Court’s makeup had changed in the recent past,
with the passing of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor’s retirement.125
Pundits are still trying to figure out the Roberts Court.126 Any benefits that either the
Forecasting Project’s decision tree or the experts could gain from experience about the
Court likely did not exist for the participants in FantasySCOTUS. In this sense, it was
likely harder to predict the October 2009 Term than the October 2002 Term.
¶66
Putting aside the temporal disparities, in Table 3 we calculated the overall accuracy
ratio as a percentage—which is not dependent on specific terms, cases, or Justices—for
the FantasySCOTUS power predictors and crowd, as well as the Forecasting Project’s
experts and decision tree.127
TABLE 3. ACCURACY RATIOS
Group

¶67

Correct

Incorrect128

Total

FantasySCOTUS Crowd

30 (44.0%)

38 (56.0%)

68 (100%)

FantasySCOTUS Power Predictors

44 (64.7%)

24 (35.3%)

68 (100%)

Forecasting Project Experts’ Aggregate Votes

101 (59.1%)

70 (40.9%)

171 (100%)

Forecasting Project Decision Tree

51 (75%)

17 (25%)

68 (100%)

The FantasySCOTUS crowd performed the worst, with an accuracy of 44%. In
comparison with the Forecasting Project, the results from FantasySCOTUS power
122

Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1160–61.
“A natural court is a period during which no personnel change occurs.” SPAETH ET AL., supra note 102,
at 30.
124
Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
125
Id.
126
See e.g., Adam Liptak, The Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1.
127
The number of cases over which we measured the wins and losses (sixty-eight) is only equal to the
number used in the Forecasting Project by coincidence. For example, we removed a number of split
outcomes, such as Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138
(2010), which was affirmed in part and reversed in part—an outcome that FantasySCOTUS could not
easily predict. We also excluded cases which were carried over to the next term, such as Harrington v.
Richter, 130 S. Ct. 1506 (2010) (mem.).
128
For measurement purposes, cases where the same number of users predicted the case would be affirmed
and reversed were treated as incorrect to avoid inflating the results. A tie is not a correct prediction.
123
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predictors present a success story, in part. The power predictors, compared to the experts
used in the Forecasting Project, predicted a higher percentage of cases correctly—64.7%
to 59.1%. This 5.6% difference is not significant enough to draw any broad conclusions
about the comparative expertise of the power predictors compared to the Project’s
experts.129 If the two groups were to make predictions for the October 2012 Term, for
example, we could not rule out the possibility that the Forecasting Project’s experts
would not outperform the FantasySCOTUS power predictors. These results suggest that
further testing could bring the power predictors’ results closer to the accuracy rate of the
decision tree. The Forecasting Project’s decision tree performed better than the
FantasySCOTUS power predictors—75% to 64.7%.
Comparatively, the
FantasySCOTUS power predictors rank between the Forecasting Project’s experts and
the decision tree Super Cruncher algorithm.
¶68
This comparison demonstrates that in this instance the wisdom of the crowds
surpassed specialized experts, yet the Super Cruncher decision tree surpassed the crowd.
As Professor Ayres noted, Super Crunchers have the power of “invading and displacing
traditional experts,” such as the Supreme Court experts the Forecasting Project selected,
and, as this analysis shows, even the wisdom of the crowds.130
¶69
Only three experts in the Forecasting Project accurately predicted a majority of the
cases (more than 50%, thirty-five out of sixty-eight cases). In order to obtain a more
accurate analysis and compare similar actors, Table 4 calculates the accuracy of
predictions made by the top three Forecasting Project experts, the top three power
predictors, as well as the Forecasting Project’s decision tree.
TABLE 4. TOP THREE EXPERTS VERSUS TOP THREE POWER PREDICTORS
Group

¶70

Correct

Incorrect

Total

The Forecasting Project’s Top Three Experts’ Aggregate
Votes

101
(59.1%)

70 (40.9%)

171
(100%)

The Forecasting Project’s Decision Tree

51 (75.0%)

17 (25.0%)

68 (100%)

FantasySCOTUS’ Top Three Power Predictors’ Aggregate
Votes

153
(75.7%)

49 (24.3%)

202
(100%)

The FantasySCOTUS top triumvirate, who averaged a 75.7% accuracy rate,
surpassed the top three Forecasting Project experts, who averaged a 59.1% accuracy rate.
These results suggest that the experts who predicted the most cases for the Forecasting
Project did not have the predictive prowess the authors were seeking. It is unclear if
credentials and pedigree—such as scholarship, Supreme Court practice, and Supreme
Court clerkships, the metrics the Forecasting Project selected—sufficiently signal a
prognosticator’s jurisprudential prescience. From these two data points—the Forecasting
Project and FantasySCOTUS—it appears that credentials do not correlate with an ability
to predict cases. The FantasySCOTUS top three power predictors not only outperformed
the Forecasting Project’s top three experts but they also slightly outperformed the
129

At a 90% confidence interval, the margin of error for the power predictors’ prediction is 63.7% ± 9.53%.
At the low end, the power predictors’ accuracy rate is only 54.17%, lower than the Forecasting Project’s
experts’ rate. However, at the high end, the power predictors’ accuracy is 73.23%, only 1.77% away from
the decision tree’s accuracy.
130
AYRES, supra note 5, at 11.
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decision-tree algorithm—75.7% to 75%.
Justin Donoho, the Chief Justice of
FantasySCOTUS, achieved an accuracy rate of 80%, while the second and third place
users scored 75% and 72% respectively.
¶71
The current iteration of the decision tree, however, suffers from an obvious
potential defect: “[I]t cannot handle newly appointed Justices.”131 The Forecasting
Project took advantage of a consistent Court, with no new appointments in nearly a
decade. During the October 2002 Term the Court had been made up of the same
composition of Justices for almost a decade, since Justice Breyer had joined the Court in
1994.132 The Forecasting Project made note of the natural court’s133 stability as a “unique
opportunity for research.”134 That cohort of Justices had developed a stable relationship
and voting pattern. In the last seven years, there have been four new appointments,
including, most significantly, a new Chief Justice and the replacement of Justice
O’Connor’s swing vote with Justice Alito’s more predictable vote.
¶72
While the decision tree was capable of generating an impressive accuracy rate, it
might not be able to serve as a viable model for predicting Supreme Court cases year
after year with a changing Court. “Even if a model could be constructed that perfectly fit
past Supreme Court outcomes, we could not be certain that the model’s variables and
their relationships would remain useful over time.”135 In contrast, a crowdsourced model
is flexible, resilient, and self-evolving. The members of the prediction market naturally
take note of the changes in perceptions of the Justices, and adapt accordingly. If Justice
Ginsburg were to retire next term, for example, the members may have some uncertainty
as to how her successor will vote, but the market would still continue. Further,
FantasySCOTUS does not rely on the manual categorization of cases—a subjective
process that could insert biases and undue influences into any research. It will be
possible in the future to use sophisticated algorithms to Super Crunch data from cases
based on precedents, judicial philosophy, and rules of law, rather than on the voting
history of a specific set of Justices. This methodology will allow for the prediction of
cases, with any composition of Justices or judges, in any court. This evolution will
enable the development of sophisticated judicial prediction engines.136
V. LIMITATIONS AND VALUE OF FANTASYSCOTUS 1.0
¶73

The value of the first season of FantasySCOTUS for the October 2009 Term, or
FantasySCOTUS 1.0 as we call it, is quite modest, and should be kept in perspective.
The FantasySCOTUS power predictors—those who made predictions for more than
131

Samaha, supra note 31, at 834 (citing Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1169–70, 1170 n.67).
Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1154; see also Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, supra
note 124. This makeup of the Court lasted until the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the appointment
of Chief Justice Roberts on September 29, 2005. This cadre of the Rehnquist Court, which lasted eleven
years, is tied with the 1812–1823 Marshall Court for the longest group of Justices to serve together.
133
Ruger, et al., supra note 4, at 1160 n.38 (“We adopt the commonly accepted definition of ‘natural court’
as referring to a period of time where the same nine Justices sit together on the Supreme Court without any
composition change.”) (citing JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITT, THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 315 n.a (2d
ed. 1997)).
134
Id. at 1160.
135
Samaha, supra note 31, at 835.
136
See infra Part VII-C (discussing the evolution of FantasySCOTUS).
132
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seventy-five percent of the cases—were accurate in 64.7% of their predictions. The top
three power predictors in FantasySCOTUS scored accuracy rates of 80%, 75%, and 72%,
respectively (an average of 75.7%). As novel as these results are for the first season,
FantasySCOTUS’ current predictive capabilities are respectable, but not reliable—it was
wrong, in the best case scenario, between 25% and 35% of the time.
Further, the Supreme Court typically reverses about 70% of the cases it decides
each term.137 During the October 2009 Term, for example, the Court reversed 72% of the
cases decided on the merits.138 In theory, predicting that the Supreme Court would
reverse for every case would have yielded a 72% accuracy rate, and a top-three finish (we
verified that no member of FantasySCOTUS made predictions in this manner).
FantasySCOTUS 1.0 should be understood for what it does and does not do. The
authors of the Forecasting Project recognized that “[w]hat is notable, in light of all the
attention focused on the Court, is that few have tried to systematically predict its
decisions prospectively.”139 In its current iteration, FantasySCOTUS provides real-time
ex ante predictions for individual cases. No other product performs this task for every
case argued during the Term. Comparing these results to ex post aggregate analysis, such
as the overall reversal rate of 72%, is imprecise. Simply concluding ex post that the
Court reversed approximately 72% of all cases argued during a term provides no
information about individual cases.
In contrast, FantasySCOTUS generated real-time predictions for every pending
case—not just an aggregate overall prediction of what could have been after the Term.
Further, the 72% reversal rate provides no information about which 72% of the docket
will be reversed. The reversals do not necessarily occur during the first or last cases
decided and are distributed throughout the Term, with the reversal granted based on the
merits of the case, not the remaining number of cases and outcomes.
To put it another way, armed solely with the 72% aggregate reversal rate, a
predictor would have no way ex ante of knowing how an individual case will turn out.
To say that any individual case has a 72% likelihood of reversal is a statistical fallacy.
One would have to know the specifics of the case to make that type of estimate.
Comparing ex post aggregate trends and ex ante predictions fails to account for the
independence of each case.
Additionally, the power predictors’ accuracy rates of 65% to 75% consist of data
points for each case, with an attendant confidence level of at least 90%, or in some cases
95% or 99%. For many of the 25% to 35% of cases that FantasySCOTUS failed to
accurately predict, we knew ex ante that we lacked sufficient data to make an accurate
prediction. For the most part, we were not surprised when the predictions were correct.
137

See, e.g., Stat Pack OT2010, supra note 6, at 4 (indicating the Supreme Court reversed 72% of its cases
during the October Term 2010); Stat Pack OT2009, supra note 6, at 10 (indicating the Supreme Court
reversed 71% of its cases during the October Term 2009); SCOTUSBlog Stat Pack Final Data 6.29.09,
SUP. CT. U.S. BLOG 10 (June 29, 2009), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/full-statpack.pdf (indicating the Supreme Court reversed 75.9% of its cases during the October Term 2008).
138
Final Stats OT09–7.7.10, supra note 6, at 2.
139
Ruger et al., supra note 4, at 1154. Also notable is how little attention is paid to attempting to
accurately catalogue the past work of the Court, which can be crucial for determining how the Court or
individual Justices may resolve a case in the future. See, e.g., Ross E. Davies, Craig D. Rust & Adam Aft,
Justices at Work, or Not: New Supreme Court Statistics and Old Impediments to Making Them Accurate,
14 GREEN BAG 2D 217 (2011).
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Likewise, we were not surprised when the predictions were incorrect, based upon the
standard statistical measures of reliability we were able to generate based on the
predictions before the Court decided the case.
¶79
Consider two cases decided during the October 2009 Term. For Levin v.
Commerce Energy, Inc.,140 the data were not significant, and would not yield an accurate
prediction. For Wood v. Allen,141 the data were significant, and we were virtually certain
that the prediction would likely be accurate. For Levin v. Commerce Energy, only fiftyfive percent of members predicted that the Supreme Court would affirm the lower court.
At a 90% confidence level, the confidence interval was ± 11.57.142 Thus, the actual
likelihood of an affirmance could be as high as 66.57%, or as low as 43.43%. If the
likelihood of an affirmance reaches below 50%, we can no longer be confident that the
prediction will be accurate. At the time, in a Predictions of the 10th Justice column, we
noted that the data were “not strong enough for the [prediction] to be significant.”143 The
Court ultimately reversed the lower court 9–0, a minority (forty-five percent) correctly
predicting a reversal.
¶80
In contrast, Wood v. Allen provides an instance where we knew ex ante that our
predictions would almost certainly be accurate.144 In the case, 80% of members predicted
that the Court would affirm the Eleventh Circuit. At a 99% confidence level, the
confidence interval was ± 11.65.145 The actual likelihood of an affirmance could have
been as low as 68.35%, or as high 91.65%. In either scenario, the confidence at a 99%
confidence level that the Court would affirm was greater than 50%. Recognizing this
certainty, at the time, we noted that FantasySCOTUS members would be “extremely
accurate at predicting the general outcome.”146 We were not surprised when the Justices
voted to reverse. With the appropriate confidence interval, we can signal in advance the
statistical measures indicating whether the prediction stays above 50% for affirm or
reverse, and, if so, the confidence interval at which that prediction stays above 50%.
From this, we can determine how reliable, or unreliable, a prediction is.
¶81
While a thirty-five percent failure rate is still largely unhelpful—it is doubtful
anyone could meaningfully rely on FantasySCOTUS at its present accuracy rate—a
larger subscriber base could increase the accuracy. FantasySCOTUS 1.0 had 5,000
members. FantasySCOTUS 2.0—the season that began with the October 2010 Term—
has approximately 10,000 members. With developing partnerships with Westlaw and
enhanced marketing strategies, we hope to double that number next season. As
FantasySCOTUS grows, and more members sign up, with a wider range of views and
opinions, our crowd grows, and we can obtain more data points. With more data points,
the confidence interval shrinks. Even at higher confidence levels (90%, 95%, and 99%),
we expect to see more reliable predictions above 50% to either affirm or reverse.

140

130 S. Ct. 2323 (2010).
130 S. Ct. 841 (2010).
142
Josh Blackman, FantasySCOTUS.net—Revisiting American Needle, Graham v. Florida, Comstock, and
Berghuis, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (June 2, 2010, 9:35 PM), http://joshblackman.com/blog/?p=4577.
143
Id.
144
Josh Blackman, FantasySCOTUS.net Predictions of the 10th Justice: Testing the Wisdom of the Crowds,
JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Feb. 4, 2010, 10:46 PM), http://joshblackman.com/blog/?p=3951.
145
Id.
146
Id.
141
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FantasySCOTUS 1.0 generated a data set that allowed us to develop an analytical
framework to devise a prediction market for the Supreme Court. FantasySCOTUS also
provides new insights into predicting Justice behavior. As we continue to gather data, we
can see what this information teaches us about the models of judicial decision making,
and whether applying different models (such as attitudinal models147) yields different
types of predictions. In learning about how people predict the Justices will interact, we
may learn something about how they actually interact and thus something about the
institution of the Court itself.148 As this technology develops in the future, possibilities of
an automated approach to understanding judicial behavior are vast.
VI. IMPACT OF THE MEDIA

¶83

FantasySCOTUS, and Supreme Court speculation in general, may pose somewhat
of a chicken and egg problem. Are predictions of members organically developed based
on the existing precedents and how the Justices interact during oral arguments? Or, do
media accounts that describe these precedents and interactions artificially generate
predictions in the minds of members? In other words, does FantasySCOTUS “react more
than [it] predicts”?149 This section explores the relationship between the nature of
Supreme Court predictions and the impact media coverage plays in these predictions.
More specifically, we focus on the benefits of a prediction market, even in light of its
potential reactionary tendencies.
¶84
Excluding two outlier cases, we found a strong correlation between the amount of
media attention and the accuracy of predictions for both the power predictors and the
crowd. The power predictors’ edge is dulled for cases that receive significant media
coverage. For unpopular cases that receive less media attention, and thereby less
information for prospective predictors, the crowd tends to generate less accurate
predictions. In contrast, the power predictors, who perform their own due diligence and
research irrespective of media coverage, can thrive even on the most obscure cases on the
docket.
A. Reactionary Prediction Markets
¶85

Professor Orin Kerr posed an interesting question about TradeSports, a prediction
market that aimed to predict who President Bush would nominate to replace Justice
O’Connor. The morning that President Bush announced that Judge John Roberts was his
nominee, TradeSports erroneously predicted that Judge Edith Clement—the popular
nominee in most media accounts—would be the nominee.150 Presaging this faulty pick
based on media consensus, Kerr wrote:
The choice of O’Connor’s replacement belongs to one man, George W. Bush. A
few inside advisors are privy to his thinking, but I think it’s fair to assume that
neither Bush nor any of his inside advisors are placing any bets on sites like
147

See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW
406–97 (2009).
148
See id.
149
Note, supra note 15, at 1223.
150
See ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 91, at 38–39.
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TradeSports.com. This means that the people who are placing bets presumably
are outsiders who are getting their predictions from newspaper articles, blogs,
horoscopes, etc., and then placing bets. As a result, a site like TradeSports would
seem to just mirror the collective common wisdom of newspapers and blogs on a
question like this. Am I missing something?151

¶86

¶87

¶88

¶89

Commenting on Kerr’s post, Michael Abramowicz noted that prediction markets “do not
seem to tell participants much more than they could figure out themselves by considering
the underlying materials.”152 Do prediction markets merely repeat information in the
media?
FantasySCOTUS provides a unique opportunity to test Professor Kerr’s idea. In
order to consider the impact of media coverage on all of the participants—the crowd and
power predictors—we gathered data on the media attention of each case and compared it
against the accuracy of predictions. This data helped to answer two questions: first, did
the media attention the cases received correlate with the accuracy of the predictions; and
second, can the cases that had a statistically significant gap between the crowd’s
predictions and power predictors’ predictions be explained in part by the quantum of
media attention?
Even if prediction markets are primarily reactive, they still serve a very important
role—aggregation. How can one quantify the “collective common wisdom of
newspapers and blogs”?153 Markets, such as FantasySCOTUS, serve as a clearinghouse
of sorts and provide an easy way to assemble the totality of knowledge in the media and
elsewhere, even if the predictions merely reflect that consensus. The prediction markets
“at least opened up the possibility of accomplishing the task of evidence aggregation,”154
which is a very important task. On average, the prediction market will “be more accurate
than the prediction that the observer independently”—even Professor Kerr—“could
derive, because the market will represent an aggregation of the views of a large number
of observers.”155 Specifically, this aggregation may “in part cancel out random errors
that individuals make in predictions by overweighing or underweighing particular pieces
of evidence.”156
Like unfounded guesses as to who will be the next Supreme Court Justice, where
the knowledge is likely restricted to a few people in the Executive Branch, the outcome
of Supreme Court cases are known only by the Justices and their clerks. There is no
special inside information, known to reporters and supposed experts. Rather, the wise
crowd, who are able to read the tealeaves and pick out important questions asked by the
Justices, can determine how the Court will decide.
Some research claims that “prediction markets will work better when they concern
events that are widely discussed, since trading on such events will have higher
entertainment value and there will be more information on whose interpretation traders
can disagree.”157 Even if the information surrounding a case is “ambiguous,” perhaps
151

Kerr, supra note 7.
ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 91, at 38.
153
Kerr, supra note 7.
154
ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 91, at 38.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 121.
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resulting from contentious oral arguments or a longer-than-usual delay in issuing the
opinion, this data may result in better predictions because those most skilled in reading
between the lines and figuring out the Justice’s proclivities can put forth the best
guesses.158
B. Methodology
¶90

In order to assess whether media coverage and prediction accuracy are correlated,
the extent of press coverage about a case is relevant. However, other than limited survey
data from some power predictors,159 we had no basis to determine which media sources
FantasySCOTUS members relied on to learn about the cases. To solve this problem, we
devised an approach to determine media coverage of Supreme Court cases.160 To reflect
the transformation of how Supreme Court cases were covered, we considered two sources
of media—old school and new school. First, we looked at coverage in what could
broadly be referred to as mainstream media. For this search, two comprehensive
databases were utilized: the All News Plus database on Westlaw161 and the All Legal
U.S. News database on LexisNexis.162 Utilizing sources from both Westlaw and
LexisNexis increased the data set’s inclusiveness and allowed for normalized results.
¶91
Years ago, to learn about a Supreme Court case, one would have to wait for Linda
Greenhouse’s article in the New York Times the next day or catch Nina Totenberg’s spot
on National Public Radio. Thanks to the legal blogosphere revolution, that is no longer
the case. Many blog authors post instant analyses of oral arguments, opinions, and other
developments at the Court within minutes of the breaking news.163 To consider the
impact of coverage in the blogosphere—and sort through the tangled World Wide Web—
we searched the “Blogs on Demand” database in Westlaw.164 This blog database is quite
limited and excludes a number of the most popular legal blogs.165 To focus on the
158

Id. (“Ambiguous public information may be better in motivating trade than private information,
especially if the private information is concentrated, since a cadre of highly informed traders can easily
drive out the partly informed, repressing trade to the point that the market barely exists.”).
159
For a discussion how several power predictors made their decisions, and which resources they relied on,
see Blackman, supra note 144.
160
Objectively discerning the media attention given to a Supreme Court case is not an exact science, and
there may certainly be room to improve on the method employed.
161
WESTLAW, WINNING RESEARCH SKILLS: PROFESSIONAL LEGAL RESEARCH 185 (2008), available at
http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/banner/SurvivalGuide/PDF08/08WinningResearchSkills.pdf (The All
News Plus Wires database (ALLNEWSPLUS) “contains newspapers, magazines, journals, newsletters,
government press releases, and transcripts of television and radio shows and congressional testimony . . .
plus newswires.”).
162
Legal US News, All, LEXISNEXIS, http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?7596&GCC (last visited
Dec. 28, 2011) (“The ALLNWS file is a group file containing all of the separately searchable online legal
newspaper, magazine, and newsletter files.”).
163
See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Instant Reaction: Citizens United v. FEC (Hillary Movie Case), JOSH
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 10:08 AM), http://joshblackman.com/blog/?p=3771.
164
West E-lert Newsletter: Does Westlaw Provide Access to Any Legal or Financial Blogs?, WESTLAW
(May 2009), http://store.westlaw.com/signup/newsletters/westelert/2009-may/article8.aspx (“[T]he Blogs
on Demand database (BLOGSOD) . . . contains the full text and abstracts of a variety of financial, legal,
and business blogs . . . .”).
165
Among others, it excluded BALKINIZATION, http://balkin.blogspot.com/ (last updated Dec. 4, 2011);
INSTAPUNDIT, http://pjmedia.com/instapundit/ (last updated Dec. 4, 2011); PRAWFSBLAWG,
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sources that Court-followers read most closely, we augmented the search field to include
the blogs listed in the “ABA Journal 4th Annual Blawg 100,”166 which contains “the best
legal blogs as selected by the [ABA] Journal’s editors” and includes “the best and
brightest law bloggers in a variety of categories.”167 To comb through these sources, we
programmed a custom Google search engine that searched these 100 sites.168
¶92
The primary search problem relates to the inconsistent ways authors refer to cases.
Take Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, for example. Some authors call it
Citizens United v. FEC, others simply Citizens United, and still others call it the “Hillary
Movie Case.” Simply searching for one of these phrases would exclude a number of
relevant articles and posts. Further, a case with a common name, such as United States v.
Stevens, which can be abbreviated as simply Stevens, generated a significant number of
false negatives, especially in light of the newsworthy retirement of Justice John Paul
Stevens.
¶93
To minimize inaccurate results, we went through a process of testing multiple
search strings and reviewing the results to determine which terms would be most accurate
and allow the greatest consistency.169 Using just the unique party name in a case worked
relatively well for Citizens United, but we could not replicate that success with cases such
as Stevens or Johnson. In fact, when we just ran the more unique party name, six of the
ten cases hit 10,000 search results on the Westlaw All News database,170 indicating that
we exceeded the maximum size of search results permitted on that database.171
¶94
Utilizing the proximity searches was not particularly helpful; they were either overinclusive and maximized the search results on the databases (for example, searching for
terms in the same sentence), or under-inclusive and did not return a noticeably greater
amount of search results (for example, searching for terms within two words of each
other). Ultimately, we ran straightforward search strings for each of the cases in all four
databases (for example, “citizens united v. federal election commission”). This strategy
was under-inclusive for cases such as Citizens United, where many commenters did not
use the full case name. However, the strategy that provided the most accurate results was
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/ (last updated Dec. 4, 2011); WALL ST. J.L. BLOG, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
(last visited Dec. 4, 2011).
166
Molly McDonough & Sarah Randag, Our 100 Favorite Blawgs, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2010, at 33. In the
interest of full disclosure, Josh Blackman’s Blog was selected to this list. Id. at 34.
167
The 2010 ABA Journal Blawg 100, A.B.A. J., http://www.abajournal.com/blawg100 (last visited Nov.
13, 2011).
168
JoshBlackman.com ABA Blawg 100 Search, GOOGLE CUSTOM SEARCH,
http://www.google.com/cse/home?cx=003923726555708584283:mzan1oszugg (last updated Mar. 7, 2011).
See generally GOOGLE CUSTOM SEARCH, http://www.google.com/cse/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2011).
169
A few examples of attempted searches include—with Citizens United as an example—[“citizens united”
/s “federal election commission”]; [“citizens united” /2 “federal election commission”]; [“citizens united”];
and [“citizens united v. federal election commission”]. The search strings tested are too numerous to list.
To craft searches that yielded the most accurate search results, we utilized terms and connectors searching
in Lexis and Westlaw, with options such as: & (both search terms); or (either search term or both terms); “
” (search terms appearing in the same order as in the quotation marks); /n (search terms within n terms of
each other (where n is a number from 1 to 255); /s (search terms in the same sentence); and /p (search terms
in the same paragraph). WESTLAW, WESTLAW QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE: GETTING STARTED ON WESTLAW
5 (2009), http://store.westlaw.com/documentation/westlaw/wlawdoc/web/rswlcm06.pdf.
170
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
171
The six cases that exceeded the maximum results were Stevens, Johnson, Padilla, Graham, McDonald,
and Perdue.
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to search for the more common name cases, and we chose to follow the most consistent
path.
¶95
To further improve the accuracy of the searches, we utilized the date restriction
features in Lexis and Westlaw. The custom Google search engine we programmed did
not allow for date restrictions. Attempting to focus on the media attention that a
participant in FantasySCOTUS would have, we limited the date range from the date the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to the date the Supreme Court issued an opinion. We
compiled all of the date ranges using the Supreme Court’s official docket.172
C. Analysis
¶96

Table 5 displays the number of results we found in each database for the keyword
search between the date certiorari was granted and the date of the opinion. In the final
column, we averaged the results.
TABLE 5. NEWS DATABASE RESULTS

¶97

BLOG
SOD

BLAWG
100

Average

290

5

80

100.25

19

47

3

59

32

1/26/2009–
2/24/2010

7

28

2

37

18.5

“johnson v. united states”

2/23/2009–
3/2/2010

13

12

0

32

14.25

“padilla v. kentucky”

2/23/2009–
3/31/2010

12

38

1

69

30

“graham v. florida”

5/4/2009–
5/17/2010

16

88

5

83

48

“bloate v. united states”

4/20/2009–
3/8/2010

2

3

0

11

4

“mcdonald v. chicago”

9/30/2009–
6/28/2010

31

212

24

94

90.25

“perdue v. kenny”

4/6/2009–
4/21/2010

50

52

4

26

33

“bilski v. kappos”

6/1/2009–
6/28/2010

113

116

27

92

87

Search

Date Range

ALLNWS

“citizens united v. federal
election commission”

8/18/2008173
–1/21/2010

26

“united states v. stevens”

4/20/2009–
4/20/2010

“maryland v. shatzer”

ALLNEWS
PLUS

According to the data, Citizens United, McDonald, and Bilski received the greatest
average media coverage, while Bloate, Johnson, and Shatzer received the least. To
ascertain whether a correlation exists between the media coverage and the accuracy of
FantasySCOTUS predictions, it is helpful to scatter plot these data with a best-fit line.
172

Docket Search, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket.aspx (last updated Dec. 29,
2011).
173
This is the date the case was docketed, which we used in lieu of the original date the Supreme Court
granted certiorari during the October 2008 Term.
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Figure 2 considers the relationship between the media coverage and the accuracy of
the FantasySCOTUS power predictors. Figure 2 plot considers the relationship between
the media coverage and the accuracy of the FantasySCOTUS crowd.
¶99 FIGURE 1
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FIGURE 2
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¶100

These scatter plots allow us to draw several conclusions. First, the points slope
upward, suggesting that the more media attention a case received, the more accurate the
predictions were. However, both the crowd and power predictor best fit lines have very
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low R2 values.174 R2 ranges between zero and one. As the R2 value approaches one, we
can conclude that the predicted value is closer to the actual value. In other words, the
plot has a higher predictive power. As the R2 value approaches zero, the predictive
power decreases, and we cannot say with confidence that the predicted value
approximates the actual value. The R2 values of 0.248 for the power predictors and 0.325
for the crowd are quite low. These values signify that the predictive power of this plot is
fairly weak.
¶101
However, the crowd trended more closely with the media coverage attention than
the power predictors did. Simply put, the accuracy of the crowd improved more with
greater media attention relative to the power predictors. The power predictors, in
contrast, were able to accurately predict cases even if the media coverage was lacking.
Perhaps, the power predictors performed additional research—several members in the
survey revealed that they read oral argument transcripts, the briefs, and amici175—to hone
their results. The crowd, which predicted fewer cases, and likely invested less time into
FantasySCOTUS, was perhaps more lackadaisical with their due dilligence, and merely
relied on media accounts to form their votes.176 This would seem to bolster Professor
Kerr’s theory that prediction markets “do not seem to tell participants much more than
they could figure out themselves by considering the underlying materials.”177

174

R2 is a statistical measurement, which represents the difference between the actual outcome and the
expected outcome, in this case how far away the accuracy of a prediction was based upon the average
media hits. EVERITT, supra note 81, at 78 (defining coefficient of determination); see also Mohan P. Rao &
Christian D. Tregillis, Econometric Analysis, in LITIGATION SERVICES HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE
FINANCIAL EXPERT 6.11 (Roman L. Weil et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (“R2 is a summary measure of the
goodness of fit of the fitted regression line to a set of data. Formally, R2 is defined as the ratio of explained
sum of squares (variation of estimated Y values about their mean) to total sum of squares (total variation of
Y values about their sample mean). R2 ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 reflects that no variation in the
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables and 1 reflects that all of the variation in the
dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. Because of the heuristic simplicity of R2, it is
a widely used measure of the goodness of fit of the least squares model. . . . [T]he addition of variables to a
model generally will increase its R2. But a model with a large number of variables and a higher R2 does not
necessarily provide additional understanding of the relation between the key variables of interest and the
dependent variable. . . . Further, a model with a large number of variables is harder to interpret.”).
175
Blackman, supra note 73.
176
In Table 6, the difference between the correlations is much smaller, signifying that this observation is
potentially attributable to the outliers. Future testing may resolve this quandary.
177
ABRAMOWICZ, supra note 91, at 38.
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TABLE 6. AVERAGE MEDIA AND DIFFERENCE FROM POWER PREDICTOR AND CROWD
ACCURACY
Case

Average Media

Power Predictor

Crowd

Accuracy

Difference

Accuracy

Difference

Citizens United

100.25

71

29.25

61

39.25

Stevens

32

92

60

83

51

Shatzer

18.5

65

46.5

59

40.5

Johnson

14.25

50

35.75

45

30.75

Padilla

30

35

5

38

8

McDonald

90.25

65

25.25

66

24.25

Graham

48

60

12

49

1

Bloate

4

32

28

20

16

Perdue

33

62

29

57

24

Bilski

87

78

9

80

7

Average

-

-

15.275

-

10.075

Average, omitting outliers

-

-

5.78125

-

1.15625

¶102

The two cases with the greatest difference between media attention and prediction
accuracy were Stevens (a difference of 60 for the power predictors and 51 for the crowd)
and Shatzer (a difference of 46.5 for the power predictors and 40.5 for the crowd), as
shown in Table 6. These cases were effectively statistical outliers. With only ten cases,
the impact of these outliers significantly impacted the value of R2, and the predictive
power of the data.
¶103
Stevens was particularly problematic because Justice John Paul Stevens, who
coincidentally shares a surname with the respondent in Stevens, was still sitting on the
Court during the October 2009 Term. Therefore, any attempt to utilize a proximity
search, such as [“united states” /s Stevens], would return a number of results talking
about the United States and Justice Stevens, but not the desired search, United States v.
Stevens. Compounding this problem was Justice Stevens’s retirement, which greatly
increased the media attention he received.
¶104
Shatzer is a more unique party name, so it is likely that searching the full case name
was somewhat under-inclusive, leading to lower media attention than actually existed.
Given that we are only reviewing the data on ten cases, outliers have a much greater
impact on any potential trends, and excluding them provides a more accurate picture of
any potential correlation between media attention and the accuracy of any predictions.
¶105
We conducted a separate experiment omitting these outliers. Excluding Stevens
and Shatzer, the average difference for the other eight cases dropped drastically: from
15.275 to 5.78 for the power predictors, and from 10.075 to 1.16 for the crowd. Without
these cases, we generated two new scatter plots using the same methodologies. FIGURE 3
considers the relationship between the media coverage and the accuracy of
FantasySCOTUS power predictors, excluding Shatzer and Stevens. Figure 4 considers
158
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the relationship between the media coverage and the accuracy of FantasySCOTUS
crowd, excluding Shatzer and Stevens.
¶106 FIGURE 3
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FIGURE 4
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¶107
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Excluding the outliers, there is a much stronger correlation between the amount of
media attention and the accuracy of predictions: there was almost a three-fold increase in
the correlation for power predictors between prediction accuracy and media coverage—
from 0.25 to 0.69. Further, the correlation is much more similar when comparing the
power predictors with the crowd—a difference of only 0.00066. An R2 value of
approximately 0.7, with only eight data points—a relatively small sample size—suggests
159
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a relatively strong correlations. The power predictors predicted both of the outlier cases
more accurately. Removing those cases narrows the gap between the power predictors
and the crowd in terms of correlation.
TABLE 7. AVERAGE MEDIA FOR CASES WITH SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POWER
PREDICTORS AND CROWD ACCURACY
Case

Average Media

Shatzer

18.5

Johnson

14.25

Graham

48

Bilski

87

¶108

There are relatively few data points using only these ten cases, so analyzing the
correlation between media coverage and accuracy is mostly for observational purposes
and does not have statistical significance. For comparison, given the sharp drop off in
media attention from the first three cases to the last ten, this section considers the top
three attention getters compared to the remainder of the cases. Three of the four cases in
which the difference between the power predictors’ predictions and the crowd’s
predictions were statistically significant were also the three cases which received the least
media attention: Johnson, Shatzer, and Graham, ranked ninth, eighth, and fourth,
respectively. The fourth case with a significant difference between power predictor and
crowd predictions, Bilski, received significant media attention, ranking third out of the
ten cases.178 For Bilski, the fact that the power predictors’ predictions were still
significantly different than the crowd’s predictions appears to be an outlier that may be
explained by the highly technical nature of the patent case.
¶109
Less media attention, and thereby less information for prospective predictors in the
crowd, helps to explain the crowd’s weaker performance for the less-noteworthy cases.
In contrast, the power predictors, who likely perform their own due diligence irrespective
of media coverage, can thrive even on the most obscure and neglected cases on the
docket. With only four cases with a statistically significant difference, there are too few
data points to consider any correlation, but this consideration may yield interesting results
in future experiments.
¶110
In short, Professor Kerr’s thesis accurately observes how prediction markets
generate results, but it overlooks an important aspect of these markets. Prediction
markets serve a valuable function of aggregating and sorting knowledge and opinions in a
unified clearinghouse. This sorting, accomplished independently by the crowd and
aggregated by FantasySCOTUS algorithms, is far easier and more accurate than manually
combing through and reading the unbounded amount of information printed about every

178

Even though Graham had the fourth highest average of media hits and Bilski had the third, the jump
from third to fourth, a difference of thirty-nine, is the largest jump in the average media hits. The next
largest difference is only a fifteen point jump from Perdue to Graham, and the average difference from
case to case is only ten points. Thus, Graham is more appropriately grouped with Johnson and Shatzer in
this instance than with Bilski.
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case in the mainstream media and on blogs. FantasySCOTUS tapped a “diversity of
information [that] exist[ed] in a way that provides a basis for” predictions.179
VII.
¶111

IMPLICATIONS OF FANTASYSCOTUS

In this section, we discuss some of the jurisprudential implications of creating a
market that accurately predicts how the Court and, more specifically, how nine Justices
will vote. This market may have a broader impact on public perceptions of the Court as
an institution and its role in furtherance of the rule of law. This Part takes a brief
excursion to the future and explores how a sophisticated prediction market can contribute
to the evolution of the legal profession.
A. FantasySCOTUS and the Supreme Court as an Institution

¶112

FantasySCOTUS provides insights into how the Supreme Court is perceived.
While the Supreme Court enjoys a favorability rating of roughly 60%, higher than the
other two branches of the federal government, a recent Pew Research Center report
suggests that 46% of those surveyed think the Court is too partisan—23% thinks it is
liberal, 23% thinks it is conservative.180 Only 39% believes the Court is “middle of the
road.”181 Some polling exists as to how the public perceives certain noteworthy cases—
for example, 68% of those surveyed disagreed with Citizens United182—but no data exist
as to how people perceive the individual Justices, and their ideologies. Considering that
72% of those surveyed could not identify the name of the Chief Justice of the United
States,183 such polling of the public at large would probably be impossible, if not futile.
In this sense, FantasySCOTUS serves as one of the most comprehensive, albeit
unscientific, polling mechanisms to capture perceptions of the Supreme Court as an
institution.
¶113
While FantasySCOTUS 1.0 did not request that members identify their ideology—
we requested this information in version 2.0, and hope to elaborate on this dynamic in
future work—anecdotal evidence suggests that certain members consistently voted in a
manner that reflected a particular jurisprudential ideology. This bias usually manifests in
predictions for Justice Kennedy’s often decisive vote in 5–4 decisions. Members who
voted for outcomes that could be deemed liberal would align Justice Kennedy’s vote with
those of Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Many of these same
members made outlier predictions in a related FantasySCOTUS game to predict Justice
Stevens’s replacement, selecting long shots like Cass Sunstein or Pam Karlan. These
votes were likely based on their personal predilections rather than realistic expectations.
In contrast, members who voted for outcomes that could be deemed conservative would
179

Wolfers & Zitzewitz, supra note 27, at 120.
The Invisible Court, PEW RES. CENTER (Aug. 3, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1688/supremecourt-lack-of-public-knowledge-favorability.
181
Id.
182
News Release, Pew Research Ctr., Obama’s Ratings Are Flat, Wall Street’s Are Abysmal: Midterm
Election Challenges for Both Parties 31 (Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.peoplepress.org/files/legacy-pdf/589.pdf.
183
News Release, Pew Research Ctr., Political Knowledge Update 2 (July 15, 2010), available at
http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/635.pdf.
180
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align Justice Kennedy’s vote with those of Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito.
¶114
By enabling people to vote their preferences, and thereby express their views of
how ideological cases will be decided, FantasySCOTUS can gather how people view the
Justices. This collective wisdom of the crowds captures the public coarsening among
lawyers and law students—the vast majority of players on FantasySCOTUS—towards
the notion that judges of all ideological stripes are independent and decide cases solely
based on the law.
¶115
These results are perhaps more honest, and sober, as players are voting their actual
preferences, anonymously, with the incentive to win by accurately predicting votes.
Were the same lawyers—excluding members of the professoriate, perhaps—to be polled
formally, even anonymously, it is doubtful they would be so candid about their views of
the Justices.184 Rather, their answers may more likely be driven by platitudes as to what
they think they should answer. Ultimately, the perceptions of Court watchers no doubt
spill over, and affect the perceptions of the how the public at large views the Supreme
Court. Determining an accurate picture of how Court watchers view the Court likely
provides a window into how society at large views the Court.
¶116
These observations have several potential jurisprudential implications.
FantasySCOTUS brings into stark focus that “[w]e are all realists now.”185 Predicting
many cases, particularly the 5–4 splits, in a similar fashion to how people predict the
outcome of political elections—during the last election, this district voted Republican, so
it is likely to vote Republican again during the next election, regardless of the candidate’s
merits—reduces the judicial process from abstract, objective pronouncements of law to
ascertaining the ideological votes of individual Justices. A survey of several power
predictors suggested as much—members made predictions based on philosophical and
ideological understandings of the Justices, sometimes without any regards to the merits of
the actual case. As Prediction Markets grow more sophisticated, questions about the
ideological Court, the nature of the judicial process, and the rule of law may become
more pronounced.186
B. The Legal Prediction Market of Tomorrow
¶117

In a prescient 2005 article, Miriam Cherry and Robert Rogers postulated about an
information market to predict Supreme Court decisions, named Tiresias, after the
clairvoyant prophet of Thebes.187 The authors remarked that “[t]he ability to know a

184

A recent Pew Research Center Publication found that 39% of those surveyed view the Court as “middle
of the road,” 23% found the Court conservative, and 23% found the Court liberal. The Invisible Court,
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probable Supreme Court outcome in advance can potentially create monetary value for
practitioners, provide guidance for lower courts, and perhaps even influence the Supreme
Court itself.”188 Every year, the article notes, “probably hundreds, if not thousands, of
civil disputes and criminal prosecutions are settled that contain issues the Supreme Court
may resolve that Term.”189 Indeed, in light of the fact that the Court hears about eighty
cases each year on a variety of topics, “many with monetary ramifications, the financial
value of the Tiresias predictions could be considerable.”190 Over 100 years ago, Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote, “[t]he object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction
of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”191
FantasySCOTUS takes a first step towards Tiresias, and fulfilling Holmes’
observation, by creating a prediction market that could transform how attorneys make
decisions. Future iterations of FantasySCOTUS will be more accurate, robust, powerful,
and insightful. The software will be able to sense subtle changes in predictions at
different stages of the litigation, and incorporate the historical performance of the
Justices, and their voting patterns, along with the past success and track records of the
power predictors automatically and instantly. In the future, the predictions will likely be
accurate enough that people can meaningfully rely on them. Once the information
market yields these rates, it could become an invaluable tool for litigation decisions.
Consider two cases—one civil, one criminal—recently decided by the Supreme
Court, and how a FantasySCOTUS of the future, with a much higher accuracy rate, could
provide helpful legal and litigation assistance for lawyers.
In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court found that California
courts could not refuse to enforce contracts that prohibit class-action arbitration.192 The
case was argued on November 9, 2010 and decided on April 27, 2011.193 Assume that
before April 27, a Californian is threatening to assemble a class-action arbitration against
a company, even though the contract the customer signed prohibits class-action
arbitration. The company, following oral arguments in the lead-up to the Supreme
Court’s decision, is faced with a decision that could cost millions of dollars: risk a
California court ordering costly class-action arbitration, or settle the matter and avoid the
arbitration.
If the FantasySCOTUS of the future could predict with a degree of certainty that
the Court will find that the contracts must be enforced, the company may be hesitant to
engage in a settlement, as they will triumph in court. On the other hand, if
FantasySCOTUS predicts the Supreme Court will agree with the California courts, and
find the agreements unenforceable, the corporation may wish to settle the case, to avoid
risky and expensive class-action arbitration. These are practical and tactical litigation
decisions attorneys must make. Now, they can make this decision informed by data of
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what the Court will do, whereas in the past such decisions were made perhaps based on a
law firm partner’s “gut” instinct.194
¶122
The stakes in a criminal case could be even greater. Imagine that during an
interrogation a suspect was read her Miranda rights, did not affirmatively invoke her
right to remain silent, and subsequently made an incriminating statement. Assume that
Berghuis v. Thompkins, which presented just this issue, has been argued before the Court,
but not yet decided.195 The prosecutor offers the defendant a favorable plea bargain that
is only on the table for a limited duration; if not accepted, the prosecutor will take the
case to trial. If the defendant accepts the plea agreement, she waives all appeal rights.
¶123
The defense attorney is faced with a choice. If her client accepts the plea bargain,
and the Supreme Court subsequently finds that this interrogation did not result in a
violation of Miranda, her client will have secured a short sentence, less than what she
likely would have received at trial. Alternatively, if her client accepts the plea bargain,
and the Supreme Court finds this interrogation did result in a violation of Miranda, her
client cannot challenge the confession on appeal, and she is stuck in jail; had she gone to
trial, the court would have suppressed the evidence, and she would have likely been
acquitted without the confession.
¶124
If FantasySCOTUS shows that the Court will find a violation of Miranda rights in
Berghuis v. Thompkins, perhaps the attorney should roll the dice and go to trial, hoping
the judge will ultimately suppress the evidence, or perhaps her client could challenge it
on appeal. If FantasySCOTUS shows that the Court will not find a violation of Miranda
(the actual outcome of this 5–4 decision), perhaps the attorney should accept the
favorable plea bargain, and not risk it. These are real decisions defense attorneys have to
make. With the FantasySCOTUS of the future, this decision could be aided by informed
predictions and their accompanying statistical measures of certainty.
C. From a Crowdsourced Prediction Market to an Intelligent Litigation Assistant
¶125

Admittedly, in its present form, FantasySCOTUS 1.0 is not particularly reliable for
making important legal decisions. Further, while the eighty or so cases the Supreme
Court decides each year are no doubt quite significant and of broad interest,196 the
282,307 civil cases commenced in federal district courts197 and the 56,790 appeals
commenced in federal circuit courts in 2010 affect far more people.198 A prediction
market that can provide accurate predictions for the vast number of cases filed and
appealed in federal courts each year could prove invaluable to lawyers and non-lawyers
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alike. Building on an idea developed by Professors Kobayashi and Ribstein in Law’s
Information Revolution,199 a future version of FantasySCOTUS could shift from using a
crowdsourced model (it is not likely that enough people will be intimately familiar with
the thousands of cases decided in the inferior courts) to an algorithm that can Super
Crunch data with an improved decision engine. The model would analyze data from
previously decided cases to offer predictions for cases not yet filed.
¶126
It would be quite conceivable for a bot to crawl through all of the filings in
PACER200—which stores every brief, opinion, and order filed in the federal courts,
reportedly around 500 million documents201—and develop a comprehensive database of
all aspects of how each court works. Using sophisticated text-recognition and natural
language searches, a database could automatically index all of the cases—eliminating the
need for fallible research assistants to laboriously tag cases. The system would note, for
example, the parties to the case, the author and nature of a filed brief, the court it is filed
with, the judge overseeing the case, the type of case it is, the damages or relief sought,
the alleged merits of the case, the timeline of the case, the ultimate resolution of the case,
and so on. This process would be instantly performed with every new filing, so the
database would always be up to date with the latest jurisprudential and litigation trends,
eliminating the need to resort to outdated data sets from the past.
¶127
With these data, a prediction engine could determine the various traits of successful
and unsuccessful actions of various types, in various courts, under various circumstances.
With enough data the prediction engine could provide, ex ante, a prognosis of how a case
will likely proceed. Telling a client how a case will turn out—usually any client’s main
concern—is something that attorneys, no matter how well qualified, can only do
imprecisely. As Professor Ayres remarked, “[t]rolling through databases can reveal
underlying causes that traditional experts”—even pricey, experienced lawyers—“never
even considered.”202 If lawyers could ascertain in advance what the likely results of
litigation would be, they could “avoid[] disputes altogether”203 and settle out of court.
Even if the dispute cannot be avoided, a realistic prediction of probable damages could
yield “ways to contain disagreements amicably and to avoid unnecessary escalation.”204
¶128
But what if the engine could tell an attorney not only what will happen, but also
how it should be accomplished? Imagine a program similar to the iPhone’s Siri
application. Call it Harlan. A would-be litigator could tell Harlan the relevant parties,
the facts, the merits, and the remedy sought and share any relevant documents.205 Harlan
could generate a roadmap of how the case would be resolved with different judges in
199

Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 9, at 1201 (“Lawyers might collaborate with computer scientists to
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predict case results.”).
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different courts, and perhaps even recommend an ideal forum (call it fantasy-forumshopping). Harlan could explain how best to structure the litigation, what types of
motions would be most successful, and how to arrange arguments. With advances in
artificial intelligence—Google developed cars that drive themselves, and IBM’s Watson
defeated the Jeopardy world champion206—it is not much of a stretch to suggest that
Harlan could even draft the briefs (many sections of briefs today are copied from
boilerplate anyway), or at least check the persuasiveness of the arguments against other
successful arguments already accepted by courts. Harlan would also work wonders for
non-lawyers. A person could download the app, talk to Harlan in plain language, explain
the problem, and listen to possible remedies—that may or may not involve paying a
lawyer. Harlan would improve access to justice, at little to no cost.
¶129
Such a product would transform the legal profession and our society. This change
would require a fundamental rethinking of approaches to legal education,207 the practice
of law, and, broadly speaking, our system of justice. It will likely first be first met with
doubt—“computers can’t replace human lawyers!” This technology would not be about
replacing lawyers (at least not lawyers who adapt208); rather, it would provide advocates
with information and knowledge to serve clients more effectively and at a lower cost.
Next, there will likely be fierce resistance to change from entrenched interests in the form
of ethical and regulatory challenges209—“computers can’t follow the rules of ethics and
they will provide ineffective legal assistance to non-lawyers!” These criticisms are fair,
but such technology could provide opportunities to improve the quality of representation
to all segments of society. Rather than instinctively opposing any change that upsets the
status quo, these new technologies should be met with tempered enthusiasm. Reforms to
the regulatory regime will come,210 followed by gradual acceptance of this technology.
We hope that FantasySCOTUS will serve as a first step in the evolution from today’s
time-consuming, customized labor-intensive legal market to tomorrow’s on-demand,
commoditized law’s information revolution.211
206
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VIII.
¶130

CONCLUSION

The inner-workings of the Supreme Court of the United States are shrouded in
secrecy. From the first Monday in October until the last week in June, the Justices
operate behind-the-scenes to decide some of the most important issues in our society.
Now FantasySCOTUS can provide real-time predictions how the Court will decide these
cases. The FantasySCOTUS crowdsourced prediction market provides a novel insight
into how Court watchers perceive the decision-making of the United States Supreme
Court.
This essay lays the foundation for future research into the predictive power of
FantasySCOTUS. Ultimately, the data that serve as the basis for this Article are simply a
starting point. As FantasySCOTUS continues to crowdsource new information, we will
gain new and deeper insights into the task of predicting Supreme Court cases and
modeling judicial behavior. Looking forward, this project is not just a scholarly
exposition of a theoretical construct or a discussion of a novel fantasy league that yields
respectable, but an analysis of not-yet reliable, Supreme Court predictions. Rather, it is
effectively an emerging plan for a legal information service that could transform the way
lawyers, and non-lawyers alike, interact with courts in the not-so-distant future.

(“When technologies become widely dispersed, such as electricity and running water, they eventually
become utilities. With capitalism driving down prices and increasing competition, these technologies will
be sold like utilities, that is, we don’t care where they come from and we pay for them only when we want
them.”); SUSSKIND, supra note 203, at 32 (“In summary, a commoditized legal service is an IT-based
offering that is undifferentiated in the marketplace (undifferentiated in the minds of the recipients and not
the providers of the service). For any given commodity, there may be very similar competitor products, or
the product is so commonplace that it is distributed at low or no cost.”); Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note
9, at 1218 (“[T]he opportunities evident in advances in information technology will make more visible the
costs of maintaining the current system of relying on the one-to-one delivery of legal advice and the
benefits of moving to a legal information market.”).
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